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Current History

Founded in 1914 by
The New York Times

Published by
Current History, Inc.

Editor, 1943-1955:
D. G. REDMOND

NOVEMBER, 1959
Volume 37 Number 219

Publisher:
DANIEL G. REDMOND, JR.

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Assistant Editor:
JOAN L. BARKON
Promotion Consultant:
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Published monthly by Current History, Inc., Publication Office, 1822 Ludlow St., Phila. 3, Pa. Editorial Office, Wolfpit Rd., Norwalk, Conn. Entered as second class matter May 12, 1943, at the post office at Philadelphia, Pa., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright, 1959, by Current History, Inc.

Current History

Vol. 37

November, 1959

No. 219

What hope is there for improved relations between the Communists and the Western World? Here, seven articles explore Russian policies and attitudes in crucial areas of the globe. In the introductory article, the belief in the world triumph of communism is viewed as a vital "social myth" for the Russian people, but one that does not preclude continuing peaceful coexistence.

The Dogma of Communist Victory

By JULIAN TOWSTER

Professor of Political Science, University of California

THE drama of Nikita Khrushchev's visit to America has posed anew the most crucial questions of midcentury: what is the essence of the Soviet concept of "coexistence" and how viable can coexistence be in view of persistent Soviet avowals of the inevitable victory of world communism?

For over four decades the dogma of world revolution has periodically cast its shadow over the politics and politics of the West. Seeking to gauge the changing purposes and strategies of the Soviet rulers at various stages in the regime, foreign interpreters have at times professed to see the subordination of the goal of world revolution to the dictates of the Russian national interest, while at other times they have diagnosed the convergence and merger of these ends. The recent Soviet attainment of outstanding technological and scientific progress—useful for good or evil—on the one hand, and the simultaneous arrival at a thermonuclear stalemate rendering all-out war suicidal, on the other, has brought into new focus the question of the Soviet aim at a worldwide victory of communism. The heirs of Stalin have repeatedly asserted that only wholehearted acceptance of coexistence by both the Western and Communist camps can halt the fatal march of mankind toward the final catastrophe of universal destruction. With

rare exceptions, they have accompanied these warnings by a call for "peaceful competition." Inevitably certain queries come to the fore: what is the real meaning of these formulas? How strong has the Soviet belief in the world triumph of communism been through time? Are the Soviet leaders now ready to temper or modify this dogma in theory or practice or both in the interest of genuine coexistence?

In essaying an answer to these questions we should state at the very outset that whatever the differences and struggles between the political leaders of the U.S.S.R. at various times and whatever the divergences in emphases, policies and prescriptions among them, the concept of the inevitable victory of communism has been characterized by a remarkable degree of continuity and consistency. The founder and father of the Soviet state, V. I. Lenin, repeatedly expressed absolute faith in such victory and asserted the need of proletarian assistance for its consummation. A year after the outbreak of World War I, Lenin declared that, while due to the law of the unequal development of capitalism, the victory of socialism would initially be possible only in a few or even in one capitalist country, the proletariat of that country would rise against the rest of the capitalist world and attract its oppressed

masses, "raising among them revolts against the capitalists, launching in case of necessity armed forces against the exploiting classes and their states." Having stated in 1919 that "the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable," that one or the other must triumph in the end, he told the Comintern congress the following year that the task of Communists would be that of "leading on to the victory of the world revolution and the establishment of an international proletarian Soviet Republic." In 1921, laying the foundation for what Stalin later elaborated into a formidable strategy of associating colonial revolts with Communist risings or proletarian struggles in industrialized countries, Lenin declared that the colonial countries—despite the backwardness of their toiling masses—would "play a very important part in the coming phases of the world revolution." While he subsequently cautioned against precipitating a showdown with the capitalist states until their strength was undermined by internecine wars and colonial upheavals, he continued to the end of his days to believe that the world had already entered upon the path of revolution which would end in the Communist millennium.

The struggle between Stalin and Trotsky after Lenin's passing has been frequently depicted in the West in terms of a fundamental opposition between Stalin's obsessive idea of "socialism in one country" and Trotsky's championship of "world revolution." Yet, Stalin's writings, viewed in their entirety, leave not a shadow of doubt that he believed a Socialist Russia to be merely the beginning and the very foundation of a Communist victory on a world scale. The U.S.S.R., Stalin told the Congress of Soviets before which he introduced the first Union constitution on December 30, 1922, is "the prototype of the future World Soviet Socialist Republic"; this view was embodied in the text of the constitution itself. In 1923, he argued before the Party Congress that the entire East regarded the Soviet Union as an experimental field, and if the nationality problem were properly solved in the U.S.S.R. the East would see in it "a banner of liberation, a vanguard in whose steps it should walk"; otherwise the Soviet Union would lose its

power of attraction to the distinct detriment of the fortunes of communism: "either we inflame the deep rear of imperialism—the eastern colonial and semi-colonial countries, revolutionize them and thus hasten the fall of imperialism; or we shall botch things here and thereby strengthen imperialism and weaken our movement."

Stalin's idea of an intimate interrelationship and interaction between the concepts of world revolution and U.S.S.R. survival emerges clearly in a series of statements made between the years 1924 and 1927. In his eulogy on the death of Lenin (January 26, 1924) Stalin stated this cardinal position as follows:

Lenin never regarded the Republic of the Soviets as an end in itself. To him it was always a link needed to strengthen the chain of the revolutionary movement in the countries of the West and East, a link needed to facilitate the victory of the working people of the whole world over capitalism.

The victory of socialism in one country, he explained later in the year, is not "complete" because, unaided, the workers of that country cannot guarantee it against intervention and restoration of the old regime. For that, the victory of socialism "at least in several countries" would be requisite. Hence, said Stalin, "the fostering of revolution, the support of revolution, in other countries, is incumbent upon the country where the revolution has triumphed." The victory of the revolution in Russia is "the beginning and groundwork for the world revolution," or as he put it in an exposition on strategy and tactics, the consolidated dictatorship of the proletariat in one country is to be used "as a base for the overthrow of imperialism in all countries."

From these early theoretical formulations on the one hand, and the dictates of practical necessity of a state embarking on vast industrialization and agricultural collectivization programs on the other, new utterances were born. These gave currency to the dialectical thesis of "coexistence-competition" which has persisted to this day. In what has become the classic Communist position on the subject of competition, Stalin told the Fourteenth Party Congress in December, 1925:

The fundamental thing in this field [of international relations] is the fact that there is no

longer in the world an all-embracing capitalism. . . . The world is split into two camps: the camp of imperialism and the camp of struggle against imperialism. . . . At the head of the lands of capitalism place themselves two basic countries—England and America, an Anglo-American union. At the head of those who are dissatisfied with and are struggling unto death against imperialism, places itself our country—the Soviet Union . . . two fundamental but opposing centers of attraction are created, and correspondingly, in the entire world, two directions of gravitation: England-America for the bourgeois governments, and the Soviet Union for the workers of the West and the revolutionaries of the East. England and America attract with their riches, from them credits are obtainable. The Soviet Union attracts with its revolutionary experience, experience in the struggle for the liberation of the workers from capitalism and the oppressed peoples from imperialism. . . . Two camps, two centers of attraction.

Then, giving this concept more of an economic underpinning, Stalin told a visiting American labor delegation in 1927, when the first five-year plan was about to be launched: "The struggle between these two centers for the conquest of the world economy will decide the fate of Capitalism and Communism throughout the whole world, for the final defeat of world capitalism means the victory of socialism in the arena of world economy." But in the same years and on the same occasions, Stalin also argued that in consequence of the failure of both Western intervention in the Russian Revolution and Communist revolution outside of Russia, a certain balance of forces had emerged between the two camps, a stage of "peaceful coexistence" with ties along trade lines. And, partly at least with the needs for foreign credits and technical assistance in mind, he concluded (1927):

Therefore, the maintenance of peaceful relations with capitalist countries is an obligatory task for us. The basis of our relations with capitalist countries consists in admitting the coexistence of two opposed systems.

These two sets of ideas—the insistence on the interdependence of the international revolution and Soviet survival and the assertion of the coexistence and simultaneous competition of capitalism and communism—took root by the end of the 1920's and have guided Soviet thinking ever since. But

whereas prior to the emergence of the Nazi threat Soviet pronouncements on aid to revolutionary movements had often conveyed overtones of possible violent assistance, from the mid-1930's on official statements have emphasized the force of example as the means of contributing to the expansion of socialism. In 1932, Manuilsky assured foreign Communists that, as compared with the Bolsheviks in 1917, they will have the distinct advantage of "an enormous place d'armes of the proletarian revolution and socialism in the U.S.S.R." in their rear when they take the path of revolution. S. M. Kirov, at that time considered Stalin's heir apparent, concluded a Party report on a customary note that with the completion of the foundation of the socialist structure the millions of workers and oppressed of East and West would not only help defend that foundation, but "following the great example of our Soviet country, they will rise to establish the world dictatorship of the proletariat and begin to build the socialist structure on a world scale."

But by 1936 Stalin ridiculed the idea that revolution can be exported, while the Party theoretician Bukharin sought to dispel foreign fears of Soviet interference by revolutionary assistance or war in the following statement in the American journal *Foreign Affairs*:

Do we believe in the world-wide triumph of Socialism? Of course we do. Moreover, we know for sure that this will undoubtedly come, as a result of the inner contradictions of capitalism, through the victory of the historically progressive forces within it. We know that our diagnosis and prognosis are scientific and exact. But does this mean that the U.S.S.R. should interfere in the affairs of other states or pursue a policy of conquest? Of course not. For the best "propaganda" of all is the very fact of existence and uninterrupted development of the new economic relations and the new culture. It would be sheer stupidity to interrupt this process.

Hence it follows that not only from the economic but from the purely political standpoint—not only from the standpoint of the U.S.S.R. proper but also from that of the ultimate world-wide victory of Socialism—it is utterly senseless to think of a policy of war being adopted by the proletarian state.

It will be seen that in all of these pronouncements, as well as in Stalin's 1938–1939 doc-

trine that the Soviet state would not wither away even under communism until "the capitalist encirclement is liquidated and a Socialist encirclement takes its place," the fundamental belief in the ultimate worldwide Communist victory has been maintained. And while at the end of World War II Stalin assured foreign visitors that "peaceful coexistence" between the U.S.S.R. and America, between communism and capitalism, is entirely possible, Molotov used the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the Revolution (1947) to express the abiding conviction of the Soviet leaders in the following declaration:

The convulsive efforts of imperialism, under which the ground is swaying, will not save capitalism from its approaching doom. We are living in an age in which all roads lead to Communism.

Lastly, although with Stalin's passing (1953) his heirs have abandoned the theory of "capitalist encirclement" and have modified the doctrines of inevitable war and revolutionary violence in the establishment of socialism, they have not only retained but have sought to embellish the concepts of competitive coexistence and the inevitable triumph of world communism. Thus, at the Twentieth Party Congress (1956), after posing the task of outstripping the capitalist West in production, and describing plans for shorter hours, higher wages, social insurance, housing and free education, Vice-Premier Anastas Mikoyan called on Americans to "enter competition" along these lines instead of the arms race and see "whose life will turn out the better." And declaring that capitalism is already in the train of history, he concluded that communism is no longer a mere "spectre" as in Marx's and Engels' days, but is striding "with a firm and relentless step, not only through Europe but throughout the entire world."

At the same Congress, in an even more comprehensive doctrinal statement whose theses were later repeated almost verbatim in the *Foreign Affairs* article published on the eve of his departure for the United States (September, 1959), Soviet Premier Khrushchev gave expression to much of what previous Soviet leaders had vowed before, but laid particular stress on the ideas of

competitive peaceful coexistence and the inevitable march of mankind toward communism. The principle of "peaceful coexistence," Khrushchev contended, is not advanced by the Soviet Union merely for tactical considerations. The U.S.S.R. is not interested in war: it has no classes that could benefit from war and it possesses all the territory, natural wealth, raw materials and markets it needs. It is not out to overthrow capitalism abroad by exporting revolution—"it is ridiculous to think that revolutions are made-to-order." Those who ask how there can be peaceful coexistence if the Soviet Union is fighting for communism, said Khrushchev, are deliberately confusing "questions of ideological struggle with questions of relations between states." When the Soviet leaders say that the Socialist system will win out in the competition between the two systems, they do not mean that victory will be attained through armed interference in the internal affairs of the capitalist countries: "Our certainty of the victory of communism is based on the fact that the Socialist mode of production possesses decisive advantages over the capitalist mode of production." Hence, Khrushchev concluded, the camp of socialism with its population of over 900 million is growing and gaining in strength, and as its advantages are revealed from day to day its ideas are bound to encompass the globe: "Socialism has a great power of attraction for the workers, peasants and intellectuals of all countries. The ideas of socialism are, indeed, coming to dominate the minds of all toiling humanity."

Thus, the long record of Soviet pronouncements is clear. That communism is the manifest destiny of mankind is unchanging dogma—it is the first article of faith of the leaders of the Soviet state. The vital questions are: will it remain so in the future? In what context must it be viewed? What effect does it have on the actual conduct of the Soviet polity at home and abroad?

Every society lives and moves according to an image of a perfected self worthy of emulation. In the culture inherited by the Bolsheviks from the polity of Mother Russia there was an old tradition of messianism bearing salvation for all mankind, and the promise of the Communist millennium falls heir to that tradition. If, as the Soviet citi-

zens are constantly reminded, a rising per capita productivity is the key to abundance and peace, the belief in the world victory of the Communist vision of the future has become a sort of perpetual incentive and morale builder, which indirectly contributes to the staying-power of the prophets—interpreters of the new faith. It is the “social myth” of the rulers and ruled in the Soviet state. In view of such high service to internal needs, the early demise of this dogma is hardly to be expected.

Externally, its persistence leads to the exploitation of opportunities which otherwise might not be pressed. But—in the existing conditions of thermonuclear balance—it no longer compels extraordinary risks which might lead to all-out war. Moreover, a world of “coexistence”—alongside ideological competition—can be exploited to wrest useful know-how and build good will and influence of potential political value. Hence, recent Soviet revisions in theory suggest expectations of a prolonged contest by means other than overwhelming violence. And a considerable extension rather than curtailment of the current emphases on such desiderata as trade and cultural exchange, and probably even some political compromises, may be anticipated in the foreseeable future.

As for the longer range span, it would seem obvious that, as part and parcel of the admitted ideological struggle, the dogma of a world Communist victory must labor under the handicap of serious unresolved issues in

the Communist camp, such as a definitive solution of the nationality problem and the integration of the Communist lands—both of which were supposed to serve as beacons for humanity in pointing a path for the willing assimilation of nations.

Equally crucial are the questions, whether Soviet economic progress can reach the promised heights on the scheduled dates, whether it can escape the crushing bureaucratization and general freneticism that have frequently accompanied modern large-scale scientific and technological change, and whether it will offer its citizenry a modicum of liberty and democracy and prove capable of promoting that voluntary and gracious discipline of mind and body which are the indispensable foundations for the flowering of the individual and the welfare of society. And last but not least, whether the belief in the world Communist victory will remain an active dogma or fall into disuse depends in large measure on what the West and the still uncommitted nations accomplish over the ensuing years. A diagnosis offered ten years ago regarding conditions for an understanding with Russia concluded at the time:

The answer of the West to the challenge of our time is not to erect garrison states, but to make its house a fortress built on wisdom, justice and unity. The waves of crises and revolutions predicted by Communist theory need not occur. Time should give the West a chance to prove whether it is capable of realizing its full strength, of integrating its communities politically and economically on a foundation of the basic freedoms and progressive living standards. And time should also make it possible for the awakened colonial and backward peoples to look and learn, to mould their lives and find their affiliations in the world community.¹

Whether the leaders of the West and of the uncommitted East have used the elapsed time wisely, history alone will judge. But the above conditions are still prerequisites today. Only when the Western democracies learn to unite as one and the newly-established nations place genuine independence and freedom above all else, will the dogma of inevitable victory of world communism cease to bear the significance of a challenge and join the heap of dormant doctrines which exist in all faiths.

During World War II, Julian Towster served as a political analyst with the Department of Justice, Office of Strategic Services and the Department of State. He later became Chief of the Foreign Political Section of the East European branch in the Office of Research and Intelligence, Department of State. He taught at the University of Chicago from 1947 to 1949. In 1935 he visited the Soviet Union and returned in the summer of 1957 to spend some time there and in Poland and Czechoslovakia. His books include *Political Power in the U.S.S.R.* and *European Political Systems*.

¹ See Julian Towster, “Problems in Understanding Russia”, *Forum*, Oct., 1949, p. 204.

Commenting on the Soviet "big leap forward," this author points out that while industrialization is "an auxiliary instrument" for promoting world communism, "... unsatisfactory conditions prevailing in many important sectors of Soviet industry limit the freedom of the Kremlin in using industrialization as an instrument for the achievement of the broad political objectives of the Soviet Union and international communism."

Soviet Industrialization and the Cold War

By MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY

Professor of Economics, Columbia University

TO THE Western mind uncontaminated by the Marxian revelation, the Soviet way of thinking has always been something of a mystery. At this time, as the U.S.S.R. is entering the third year of its fifth decade and is approaching the half century mark, an understanding and a plausible interpretation of Communist developments and policies is as difficult as ever. The broad lines of the doctrine which governs the decisions of the Kremlin are by now generally familiar; its basic proposition pertinent to this discussion are as difficult as ever. The broad lines of the capitalist society which would be inexorably superseded by world communism. The arguments which lead Marxism-Leninism to this—from the capitalist standpoint—disheartening conclusion need not detain us here. It will suffice to recall that it stems from the

allegedly irreconcilable contradictions of the capitalist system and the disintegration of the colonial empires.

Is the communist doctrine a safe and reliable guide to an understanding of Soviet objectives, especially short-term objectives, in the complex game of world politics? How are the somber assertions concerning the inexorable downfall of capitalism to be reconciled with the notion of co-existence about which the Moscow leaders have talked so much since the death of Stalin? What did Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev expect to achieve by his visit to the United States and by pressing for the convocation of a "summit" conference? As these lines were written on the shores of the Lake of Geneva, these questions, as well as others equally bewildering which bear on Moscow's policies, admitted of no definite answer.

Uncertainty, too, besets any attempt to present a comprehensive and balanced account of the nature, course and implications of Soviet industrialization with which this article is immediately concerned. The student of Soviet affairs is continuously faced with dangers of either exaggerating Russian achievements and the significance of Soviet moves, or dismissing them too lightly.

The Course of Industrialization

Industrialization, the building up of a vast machinery of industrial production with special emphasis on the manufacturing of producers' goods, has been and still remains one of the chief objectives of Soviet planning. The other two are the collectivization of

Michael T. Florinsky is the author of many books including *Towards an Understanding of the U.S.S.R.* (1951); a two-volume study of *Russia: A History and an Interpretation* (1953); and *Integrated Europe?* (1955). Former editor of *Commercial and Tariff History*, 1939–1941, he is a member of the American Economic Association and the Economic History Association, among others. From 1921 to 1932, Mr. Florinsky served as associate editor of the *Economic and Social History of the World War*, a publication of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

agriculture and the increase in the productivity of labor which, of course, is an essential element of both industrialization and collectivization. The comprehensive plan for electrification proposed by Lenin and launched in 1921 may be regarded as the first major step along the path of industrialization. It was followed in 1925 by the so-called "control figures" and by the formal inauguration of a planned economy with the commencement, on October 1, 1928, of the First Five Year Plan. Then came the Second and the Third Five Year Plans; the execution of the latter however was interrupted by the war. Planned economy and industrialization resumed their course with the introduction in 1946 of the Fourth and, in 1951, of the Fifth Five Year Plan. The Sixth and last Five Year Plan was not permitted to run its full course; it was superseded in 1958 by the Seven Year Plan (to be completed in 1965) which at present governs Soviet development.

Each of the above plans contains provisions for the expansion of industry, usually expressed in terms of percentages of increase over the base year. It is not open to doubt that industrialization has brought about a great rise of productive capacity but the other aspects of this policy are less clear. Uncertainty is due in part to the regrettable Soviet practice of claiming the fulfillment and even over-fulfillment of planned targets while at the same time castigating enterprises and whole branches of industry for failing to meet their assignments.

The picture of industrial advancement that emerges from official data is highly impressive although it is well to keep in mind that Soviet agencies do not disclose the methods by which they arrive at their figures. According to an official report approved by the Twenty-first Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (February 5, 1959), "gross industrial output in 1958 was 36 times as great as in 1913; the production of the means of production—the foundation of the national economy—increased 83 times, and the output of machine building and metal working 240 times." In 1958 the Soviet Union produced approximately 55 million tons of steel, 113 million tons of oil, 496 million tons of coal, and generated 233,000 million kilowatt hours of electric power. It was claimed that the output of consumers' goods in 1958 was

nearly 14 times as great as in 1914 and that of commodities "for cultural and everyday purposes" had increased more than 45 times. The current Seven Year Plan calls for further huge rises in productive capacity.

These achievements, great as they are, have received in the West more than their legitimate share of publicity and at times their importance would seem to have been grossly overstated. Quite illogically, the launching of sputnik succeeded in creating the impression even in responsible circles that Soviet scientists were technically far ahead of their Western colleagues. Khrushchev's merciless drive and impudent loquacity, supported by figures such as those given above, have injected new life into, and have given new significance to, the slogan coined by Stalin as far back as 1939, at the Eighteenth Congress of the party: to overtake the West, and more specifically the United States, in per capita production.

In the United States and among her European allies excessive credence is given to this crude and bombastic propaganda which, according to Khrushchev himself, occasionally loses all sense of proportion. In a recent speech (June 29, 1959) he referred contemptuously to collective farm executives who expect to surpass the United States by doing nothing. "Some of them," Khrushchev said scornfully, "are even stuck in a bog, cannot get out, yet shout that they are overtaking America."

Technical Levels

The causes of the rapid growth of Soviet industrial capacity are almost self-evident: by keeping consumption and social services at an exceedingly low level, the rulers of the U.S.S.R. have invested in the nation's industrial plant a very high proportion of the national income. These policies were made possible by the totalitarian control which the Communist party and the Soviet government exercise. The speed of industrialization which cannot be justified on any economic ground has not only imposed upon the Russians crushing burdens (which, however, have been somewhat mitigated during the last two or three years) but has also tended greatly to minimize the efficacy of the new industrial plant.

The building up of technically competent

and smoothly-running productive units that would meet the real needs of the community is, under the most favorable conditions, an exacting task. A huge bureaucracy dominated by a doctrinaire, ruthless and arrogant political dictatorship does not make for the free operation and adjustment of economic forces while the vastness of the industrialization drive has strained to the limit Russia's scant reserves of skill and technical knowledge. Errors in planning and the faulty implementation of the assignments were and still are numerous and costly, and many of them are no doubt due to the excessive and unwarranted speed of industrialization. Soviet planned economy, far from eliminating the alleged waste and inefficiency of the system of private enterprise, has produced flagrant failures and blatant imperfections of its own.

At the end of June, 1959, the Central Committee of the party held a plenary session devoted to "the acceleration of technical progress in industry and construction." It was attended by the top party and state officials and the leaders of the Soviet economy, including the chairmen of the recently established regional economic councils. The key address was delivered by Khrushchev whose name was reverently mentioned by every speaker. In a lyrical mood, he returned the compliment by saying that "each speech was a poem, rich in ideas." The theme of the discussion was automation and although the proceedings followed the familiar immutable pattern—self-congratulatory statements of "majestic" advances in every field, coupled with denunciations of inefficiency, lack of coordination, and failure to meet the planned assignments—the criticisms voiced by the speakers were unusually revealing.

The work of the conference revolved around the central issue formulated by Khrushchev: expansion of production through the technical re-equipment of industry. The chairman of the City of Moscow's economic council complained of the inept organization of the allocation of machine tools; moreover "many enterprises have made incorrect assessments of their equipment needs. This is a consequence of managerial inefficiency." According to the same speaker 700 new machines, instruments, and appliances will go

into production in 1959. However, many of the items produced in Moscow "are on a low technical plane and do not compare favorably with familiar models." The chairman of the Leningrad economic council stated that the examination of 5,300 items of equipment produced in that region disclosed that 1,070, or about 20 per cent, "did not meet the present-day standards and were in need of replacement." Leningrad is a major supplier of television equipment, automatic telephone exchanges, powerful generator tubes, and so on. It is significant, therefore, that out of a list of 2,000 instruments that were recently checked, "approximately 800 proved obsolete and do not meet modern requirements."

Similar tales came from every corner of the Soviet empire. According to the chairman of the Sverdlovsk economic council, the performance of the geological prospecting equipment "is on a low level, and its operation requires a great deal of manual labor." The pumps produced by a local plant "are far heavier and of lower efficiency than those of foreign make." This criticism applies equally to loaders, ventilators, conveyer belts, and other items. "Although the capital construction plan for 1958 was met in terms of volume," said the Sverdlovsk official, "there were grave deficiencies in the commissioning of industrial units. Of 114 units, only 69 were completed and put into operation. A great many units were not brought into operation because the technological power equipment was not delivered." For instance, a large rolling mill,

built in record time, was unable to begin operation in 1958 owing to delays in the delivery of electric motors. A number of factory shops have not yet gone into operation for the same reason. The lag in the fulfillment of the industrial construction plan persisted in 1959, too, in the construction of a large blast furnace, for example, as well as a number of other units.

The chairman of the Dnepropetrovsk economic council discussed the production of seamless pipes by a process which, he claimed, was first developed in the Soviet Union. He maintained that

the picture is very spotty as far as the level of technical equipment of the metallurgical and other enterprises of the economic region is concerned. We have reconstructed many shops and

machine aggregates, and their equipment is now on a level with the latest achievements of progressive science and technology. At the same time however a great many of the region's enterprises are operating with obsolete equipment that was manufactured 40 or 50 years ago,

that is, before the revolution of 1917. The lack of up-to-date machines hampers the modernization of existing pipe-rolling shops, and the authorities "have often been forced to install obsolete equipment of low productivity in shops that are being modernized as well as in the newly-built ones."

A high official of the central government, the chairman of the U.S.S.R. council of ministers' chemistry committee, added his voice to the choir of lamentations. He said that "a number of major construction projects in the synthetic rubber, chemical fibers, synthetic alcohol and ammonia industry" throughout the country

have experienced severe difficulties because of the inadequate way in which they have been supplied with metal, pipes, stainless steel, cables, fittings, and a variety of building materials. . . . The status of the reconstruction and construction of each chemical plant must be subject to searching examination. . . . The volume of output of many types of chemical equipment has lagged far behind the need for them. . . . Some of the machine-building plants have not maintained the equipment-manufacturing schedules stipulated in their contracts. . . .

It would be easy to multiply these examples which are taken more or less at random. The brunt of the criticisms voiced at the June conference bore on obsolescence, failures to improve productivity through the merging of small enterprises, lack of coordination in production schedules, shortage of essential machinery and equipment, and the low technical level of those available. The new statutes of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Science (March 28, 1959) which subordinate that institution directly to the council of ministers are presumably designed to eradicate technical deficiencies by putting unreservedly at the disposal of the government the resources of Russian science.

The above pessimistic comments made by men immediately concerned with the management of Soviet industry should not be interpreted as evidence of the failure of Soviet endeavor. They merely indicate that

the Moscow government and its agents are faced with grave problems the solution of which has not yet been found. It is likely that the unsatisfactory conditions prevailing in many important sectors of Soviet industry limit the freedom of the Kremlin in using industrialization as an instrument for the achievement of the broad political objectives of the Soviet Union and international communism.

Industrialization and World Communism

It was suggested at the beginning of this article that the doctrine of world communism may not provide, in every instance, the key to an understanding of Soviet policies, especially the short-range ones. Yet Marxism-Leninism forms the inescapable background of the Soviet scene; Khrushchev has been militant and tireless in proclaiming his allegiance to Communist orthodoxy. Industrialization is an integral part of the Communist program and has an economic as well as a political function. It is with the latter that we are concerned here. The fast tempo of industrialization has been determined by political considerations. According to the Communist view the capitalist countries are determined to launch an aggressive war that would destroy the land of socialism. Hence the necessity to provide the Soviet Union, within the briefest possible time, with a powerful industrial base. Since this task has been in the main accomplished, at least in so far as the volume of production is concerned, and since the principal capitalist nations instead of making war on the Soviet Union (as ordained by the doctrine), saved Stalin from the consequences of his quasi-alliance with Hitler, industrialization has become a most useful auxiliary instrument in the promotion of the political objectives of world communism.

The staggering, if in part spurious, rates of industrial growth, much quoted but not fully understood, have added immeasurably to Soviet stature and have bred a variety of naive illusions most useful to the Communists. It is imagined, especially in the United States, that since the Soviet Union and its citizens are about to become prosperous, revolutionary zeal will melt away, the Communist leaders will abandon their messianic follies; and that no revolutionary ardor could

survive the impact of cars, television and radio sets, refrigerators, and washing machines—which are still great rarities in the Soviet Union, far beyond the reach of the masses.

No less tempting, especially to the impoverished Western nations beset by balance of payments difficulties and shaky currencies, are the prospects of increased Soviet trade which industrialization would seem to promise. Trade negotiations accompanied by intimations of large orders which may or may not come true offer endless opportunities for sowing discord among the members of Nato, the dissolution or weakening of which is a major short-range Soviet objective.

Industrialization is no less useful in undermining the position of the Western powers in the colonial and former colonial countries—another major short-term Soviet objective. The much advertised industrial achievements of the U.S.S.R., together with the widely-accepted albeit incorrect notion that Russia in 1917 was an underdeveloped country (of the same order, let us say, as Laos or Cambodia, which of course is nonsense) has created for the Soviet Union the position of

the natural leader of the teeming masses in the colonial and semi-colonial countries struggling to shake off the old shackles of poverty and backwardness.

Until three or four years ago the Western powers exercised practically a monopoly of aid to the underdeveloped countries. This is no longer the case. Timely Soviet loans, grants, shipments of machines, and arrivals of missions of Soviet technicians and economic advisers serve well the Communist objective of shattering and eventually eliminating the influence of the Western nations in areas where until recently their authority was supreme.

From the standpoint of the West the situation is grave and admits of no drastic and clear-cut solution. The Western world will need poise, patience and perseverance as well as a keen sense of reality if the worst is to be staved off. However, while the outlook is unpromising, there is no reason for despair. It will be remembered that Soviet industrialization is still in a highly experimental stage and that communism has a long way to go before it achieves its objectives. It is not beyond the ingenuity and power of the West to make sure that this is not to be.

“... We are ... convinced, however, that the basis for the soundest and most durable growth of democratic institutions within a country stems from the people themselves. History has shown that attempts to impose democracy upon a country by force from without may easily result in the mere substitution of one form of tyranny for another. We therefore believe that there is a great distinction to be observed between moral support for democratic principles which will encourage the peoples of all countries to work toward democratic goals, and attempts by other countries to promote the overthrow of governments by use of force in the hope of establishing democracy.

“Democracy and respect for the rights of man are ideals deeply cherished by the peoples of America since their earliest days. Drawing upon their common belief in the dignity of man, based upon their Christian heritage and the great philosophical ideas of Western civilization, the peoples of the Americas were inspired by democratic principles in their wars for independence. Although from time to time the achievement of these ideals has encountered obstacles and setbacks, the American peoples have never wavered in their determination to press forward toward political systems based on liberty and human dignity. The full realization of democratic principles and the guarantee of human rights remain an ideal towards which all of our countries strive. There are many factors which determine the rate at which a given people can progress in this respect. However, the peoples of America, as a matter of principle, repudiate all forms of dictatorship, whether of the right or the left.”

—Christian A. Herter, *United States Secretary of State, an address delivered at the second plenary session of the Foreign Ministers of the American States in Chile, August 13, 1959.*

According to this author, "The traditional basis of British foreign policy has been one of opposing the domination of Europe by a single over-mighty power." Since 1945, "Russian imperialism" has left Britain and her allies with "... a choice only between loss of their independence and a collective armed defense sufficient to deter the further expansion of the Soviet power."

British "Flexibility" and the Cold War

By G. F. HUDSON

Director of Far Eastern Studies, St. Antony's College, Oxford University

ON AUGUST 26, 1959, before President Eisenhower's triumphal entry into London, the *Daily Mail*, one of Britain's daily newspapers of mass circulation, printed a cartoon showing the President and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan strenuously pulling and pushing two obstinate mules with the features of French President de Gaulle and German Chancellor Adenauer up a mountain path past a signpost marked "Summit." This picture very fairly sums up the conception of the international situation which now prevails over a very large section of public opinion in Britain. For those who take this view the only measure of merit in a Western statesman is "flexibility" and the one unforgivable sin is "rigidity"; the cold war is something that must be brought to an end at almost any price, and the way to do it is through a summit conference.

By these standards the American government is considered to have made good progress since the departure of the "rigid" Dulles,

and more particularly since President Eisenhower responded to the deadlock of the foreign ministers' conference by inviting Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev to Washington. But the West German and French governments remain in deep disfavour, and the only serious international problem is how the will to peace can be made to prevail over their mulish obstinacy.

It has been possible from a reading of the popular press to watch the growth of the demand for "flexibility" in Britain over the past 12 months. The word itself in the special meaning which it now bears is new; 20 years ago the corresponding word was "appeasement"; but that is no longer respectable. The recent trend in British popular feeling has certainly produced a significant change in the national attitude since the visit of Khrushchev and Nikolai A. Bulganin (the ex-premier) to Britain early in 1956—a visit which was a sequel to the summit conference of the previous year and was expected to advance the high hopes of a *détente* raised by that meeting. The public attitude at that time was one of general apathy with an undertone of resentment at the virulent attacks on Britain which Khrushchev had seen fit to make in public speeches during his immediately preceding tour of India and Burma.

The result of the visit was nil at the official and diplomatic level and a minus quantity as far as Khrushchev's personal feelings were concerned; he was furious at being put in a corner over imprisoned Socialists in Eastern Europe at the dinner given to him by the

Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford University, from 1926 to 1954, G. F. Hudson was a Rockefeller Foundation Fellow (1932). He served 7 years with the British Foreign Office, 1939–1945. An editor of *The Economist*, he is also author of *Europe and China: Their Relations in History to 1800* and *The Far East in World Politics*.

Labour party, and he was deeply offended at the lack of popular welcome, which he apparently attributed to official discouragement. While it is true that the British government at that time had lost its original enthusiasm for the visit as a result of Khrushchev's anti-British speeches in India, there was certainly no attempt to suppress spontaneous demonstrations of welcome if the popular mood had been inclined thus to express itself. But the chilly silence with which British crowds gazed at the Soviet leaders in fact well expressed the national attitude; these were men, it implied, who had shown themselves hostile; Britain was ready to negotiate for a lessening of tension, but it was for the other side to show more good will than Khrushchev had been showing in his public utterances during the months since the Geneva conference.

Britain's foreign policy was based on the Nato alliance created by a Labour government and maintained by a Conservative government; there was no considerable body of opinion which questioned the desirability of the alliance or urged that a settlement with Russia should be reached by means of unilateral concessions. Above all, there was no sense of urgency; there was a strong desire to be rid of the cold war and of the crushing burden of armaments on the British economy, but it was felt that until the Soviet leaders could be brought to talk in a more reasonable frame of mind, Britain and her allies could afford to maintain a firm defensive stand without a serious risk of war.

Greater British Flexibility

What then has brought about such a marked change in British-Russian relations, or rather in British popular attitudes towards those relations, during the last three years, and especially in the last twelve months? First of all, of course, there have been the sputniks, the intercontinental ballistic missiles and the Soviet ultimatum on Berlin. These have created a new sense of urgency, a more pressing alarm and apprehension, a feeling that a settlement must be reached quickly if all catastrophe is to be avoided. Hence an increased pressure for negotiation, for exploring all avenues and leaving no stone unturned in the quest for peace.

But this cannot be the whole explanation, for all the Western nations alike are under the same threat from Khrushchev's blackmail, yet American, French and German reactions have not been the same as the British. It can hardly be claimed that the British as a nation are either more peace-loving or more easily frightened than their allies. If, therefore, Britain has become the champion of "flexibility" in dealing with Russia, and is today widely suspected of a willingness to yield to Russian demands over Berlin and German reunification, the reasons must be sought elsewhere than in the mere fact of the increased aggressiveness of Soviet policy.

Two main factors may be discerned: the first has been the political instability in Britain due to the imminence of a general election, and the second has been the British reaction to the new Franco-German leadership in continental Europe and the formation of the Common Market.

Diplomacy and Politics

Anticipation of a general election has been dominating British politics ever since the beginning of this year; by the time these lines are printed, it may actually have taken place.* Had an election been held during the year after the Suez crisis, the victory of the Labour party would have been a foregone conclusion. But during the past few months there has been a formidable bid by the Conservatives to retain their parliamentary majority, and the main element in this has been the build-up of the Prime Minister as the man of peace, the man who by his patient personal diplomacy has not only impressed Khrushchev with his will to peace, but has persuaded a reluctant American government to negotiate. This image of Macmillan as an international peacemaker has been very effective up to now in taking away the limelight from the Labour party's promises of a new foreign policy to end the cold war. The Labour party in power was the architect of Nato but the Labour party in opposition always tends to revert to its pacifist origins and to claim that international problems can be easily solved but for the imperialism and militarism of the Tories.

* The election is to take place on October 8, 1959.

Some time ago, so as to have an alternative foreign policy, the Labour party took up the idea of "disengagement" in Europe, and without making it clear whether this was to precede or follow a reunification of Germany, presented it to the public as a grand solution of Europe's troubles. The attraction of this project for a public looking for a way out from the tensions of the cold war and the attempt to pin the label of warmongers on the Conservatives caused the latter to start bidding for the "peace vote" by the buildup of Macmillan as the man who was making an entirely fresh start in the search for an international settlement. The preliminaries of the election campaign thus became a kind of competition in "flexibility" while nobody any longer had a good word to say for the positions Nato was supposed to be defending.

A sociologist would be hard put to it to determine how much of Macmillan's zeal for a summit conference in recent months has been due to a genuine belief in the value of a meeting of heads of governments without previous agreement and how much to a hope of electoral gain by encouraging the popular mystique of the summit. As a man of naturally optimistic temperament, he probably hoped that something might be achieved by a summit conference and that in any case the situation would be no worse than it was before; he appears to have taken the view that, if a showdown were after all to come over Berlin, it was essential that the government should be able to claim that everything humanly possible had been done to avert it. However, the support given to the idea of a summit conference as a panacea was creating just the kind of exaggerated expectation which would make such a conference most dangerous for Western statesmen by increasing the pressure on them to yield to Soviet demands rather than allow the conference to break down.

In general, the effect of electoral considerations on British politics this year has been to divert attention from the direct threat to the whole Western coalition posed by the Soviet demands over Berlin and to delude the public with imaginary solutions bearing little or no relation to contemporary European reality. The result was to make a large part of the nation think of Britain as a

mediator between the power blocs rather than as a member of a group of allies facing the sternest possible test of their solidarity and resolution. The extent to which international issues had come to be conceived in domestic political terms was strikingly shown by the statement issued by the Labour party Secretary, Mr. Morgan Philips, after an outcry in the party that the television appearance of the Prime Minister with President Eisenhower at 10 Downing Street would help Conservative electoral prospects. "We are conscious," the statement ran,

that both the B.B.C. and Independent Television are themselves jealous of the need to maintain a balance between political parties, and we feel certain they will do this having regard to the important trip which Mr. Gaitskell and Mr. Bevan are paying to the Soviet Union.

The idea that the matter could be put right by giving an equal coverage for Labour party leader Hugh Gaitskell and Khrushchev in Moscow and for Macmillan and Eisenhower in London hardly left room for doubt that in the mind of Mr. Philips at any rate the two meetings were on an equal footing and that there was no consideration of any importance except that the two rival parties should get equal publicity for their star performers.

Britain and European Unity

These excesses of party politics in an election year would not, however, by themselves have affected British attitudes towards Russia at all fundamentally had not the period also seen an unexpected international development unacceptable to British majority opinion, namely the emergence (as a result of the Franco-German *rapprochement*) of a new integration of Europe with Britain left outside. Some political observers had foreseen for several years that a crisis would arise if and when the nations of continental Europe began to get together politically and economically, since this would run counter to the deepest instincts and prejudices of the still essentially insular and isolationist British people. Even Sir Winston Churchill, a fervent believer in European unity, found he could do nothing about it when he took office because of the massive opposition within his own party. The whole issue, however, appeared rather academic, for it was supposed

that French memories of Nazi invasion and occupation would be too strong for a long time to come for any really close cooperation between France and Germany. This, however, was brought about by the very man who in 1940 defied his own country's government by refusing to capitulate to German conquest. It was the policy of de Gaulle to use a bloc with West Germany to offset what he regarded as the undue preponderance of the "Anglo-Saxon powers" within the Western coalition.

French policy under the new regime has involved clashes with the United States as well as with Britain, but Britain has been the principal loser from the new alignment of forces in Europe, for Britain (whatever the wishes or fancies of the British people) cannot be detached from Europe as the United States is. Having missed all opportunities to take the lead herself in a closer union of European nations and having refused to accept Franco-German terms for the new Common Market economy, Britain suddenly found herself in the unpleasant and humiliating position of being left out of a new European combination wielding a formidable diplomatic and economic power. At official level this was a cause of an exasperated annoyance tempered by a prudent realization that Britain must find some way of adjusting herself to the new international grouping. But at the level of popular journalism resentment has found expression in violent attacks on both West Germany and France, and particularly in a revival of fears and suspicions of Germany dormant since the war. The anti-German press campaign has been so bitter and persistent that Adenauer has publicly voiced his belief that it was inspired by the British government; de Gaulle also was so irritated by the attacks in the British press that he recently summoned the French Ambassador from London specially to report on them.

It has indeed been a tragic outcome of recent history that the most successful move yet made towards integration in continental Europe should have had the effect of producing antagonism between Britain and her continental allies just at the moment when a maximum solidarity is needed for resisting the pressure from the East. In particular the anti-German trend in British popular feeling

clearly runs counter to the official British policy of defending the independence of West Germany and the freedom of the people of West Berlin. To be anti-German is not necessarily to be pro-Russian, but in so far as the propaganda against the Bonn government has an effect, it must dispose those who are influenced by it to favour an agreement with Russia at Germany's expense. When a journalist writes that "Europe's problem child reaches for his flick-knife," he is referring not to Khrushchev, but to Adenauer, and the reader who is brought to believe that the Federal German Chancellor is the main obstacle to European peace naturally cannot understand why Britain should be in partnership with such a man.

Fortunately for the future of Britain and of Nato neither the pre-election pandering to the wishful illusions of the electorate nor the current mood of resentful anti-Europeanism are likely to be of long duration. The election cannot now be long delayed, and whichever party wins it will have to grapple at once with the realities of the situation confronting the country instead of telling voters what they want to hear. As far as Whitehall officials are concerned, there is a full realization that a Western capitulation over Berlin would be disastrous for the stability and security of Western Europe, and that Britain, France and West Germany are bound together by a common interest of defense far transcending in importance any conflicts which divide them.

Western-Soviet Stalemate

The practical objection to "flexibility" as a cure for the world's ills is that so far there has been no indication whatever that Khrushchev's implicit threat of war over Berlin has been withdrawn—apart from the removal of a specific time-limit—or that he has any kind of concession to offer on German reunification which might render tolerable some alteration of the status of West Berlin. Indeed, the joint statement issued by Khrushchev and Polish party secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka after the former's visit to Poland in July reaffirmed Moscow's original threat in the most precise terms; the two Communist leaders agreed that, if the Western powers do not agree to a German peace treaty

on terms acceptable to the Soviet bloc, they will give support to the German Democratic Republic in any steps she may consider proper within the framework of her sovereign rights with a view to liquidating the abnormal situation in West Berlin.

"Support" in this context, it has been made clear, means that the Soviet Union would use force to protect East Germany against any Western attempt to interfere with a new blockade or squeeze on West Berlin's communications. In the face of such a threat, it is difficult to see what flexibility can mean except capitulation. But unless the Western allies are not serious in their assertions of resolve to maintain their rights in Berlin, their only hope of avoiding an actual armed conflict lies in the prospect of persuading Khrushchev that he cannot make his will prevail without war and that such a war would be against the whole Atlantic coalition. The Nato powers, therefore, will have either to come together in a firm united front before the supreme crisis of negotiations over Berlin or they will fall apart with the result that the Soviet Union will gain a decisive domination over Europe. The record of the Hitler era indicates that the British people will recognize danger when it comes close to them, however much in their longing for peace they may indulge in wishful thinking about it earlier.

The traditional basis of British foreign policy has been one of opposing the domination of Europe by a single overmighty power. In the days of Louis XIV and Napoleon it was France which threatened to extend an imperial control over Europe; in the time of William II and of Hitler, it was Germany. But since 1945, it has been Russia, whose overwhelming preponderance in Europe was an inevitable consequence of the very completeness of the German defeat and of military operations which brought the Russian armies to the Elbe. It is no use now to deplore the errors of British and American policy which contributed so much to this outcome; in retrospect it can be seen that in

both countries the basic aim was simply to dispose of the matter in hand and get back to isolation and a quiet life, as in 1919.

Unfortunately for the hopes then entertained the combination of Marxist-Leninist faith with Russian imperialism has left the democratic nations of the Western world since the war a choice only between loss of their independence and a collective armed defense sufficient to deter the further expansion of the Soviet power. Britain's vital interest is involved in the North Atlantic alliance which has been formed to ensure the independence of the nations of Western Europe, and this interest must be expected to determine her policy in the long run, no matter what temporary aberrations may arise in popular feeling either from impulses to take flight from unpleasant realities or from minor grievances against essentially friendly neighbours.

The policy of the Soviet Union is basically the same towards all the independent, democratic nations of Western Europe, though from time to time Moscow attempts to take advantage of differences among them by playing one off against another. Until very recently the main thrust of the tremendous propaganda apparatus of the Soviet Union in Europe was directed towards stirring up European nationalist feelings against alleged American interference and "instigation of war," but recently it has been switched to a concentration against West Germany, and in particular against the personality of Adenauer. The aim of isolating Germany as a preliminary to acquiring political control in Bonn as in Pankow has, however, been a little too obvious, and President Eisenhower's action in beginning his European tour with a visit to Bonn was the best possible means for thwarting it. If, in the estimation of many Englishmen, Mr. Macmillan has taken the lead as peacemaker between the Western and Soviet blocs, President Eisenhower has been performing the no less important function of peacemaker within the Western bloc itself.

"During the six year period that the present Administration has been in office, the value of our country's two-way international trade has reached the fabulous total of 216 billion, 727 million dollars."

—Henry Kearns, *Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Affairs*, an address delivered July 2, 1959.

In discussing Soviet influence among the "neutral" nations of the world, this Russian specialist asserts that the alternative for the United States lies in promoting "...the development of a well-to-do agrarian class in Muslim lands. Whereas the U.S.S.R. is seeking to create an industrial class for which there is as yet no real basis, the masses of the people are already agrarian minded. Instead of a nation of fellahin, all that is needed is to transform fellahin into independent, modern farmers."

Russia and Afro-Asian Neutralism

By IVAR SPECTOR

*Associate Professor of Russian Civilization and Literature,
University of Washington*

IN THE Western world, countries that belong neither to the Soviet camp nor to the Western blocs (Nato, Meto, and Seato) are commonly referred to as the "uncommitted" nations. Thus, many of the nations of Asia and Africa, such as India, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Lebanon, the Sudan, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea and so forth, are included among the so-called "uncommitted" powers.

The use of the term "uncommitted" has aroused much resentment in Asia and Africa. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India was among the first to voice the opinion that the term was offensive to Asians. Most of the independent Arab states and India insist that they are as much "committed" as any other power, but their commitment is to neutrality rather than to the Soviet or West-

ern orbits. President Gamal Abdel Nasser has told Americans¹ that his criticism of the Soviet Union did not mean that he was aligning his country with the United States; he prefers to call the U.A.R.'s policy of non-alignment "positive neutrality." President Sekou Touré likewise defines Guinea's foreign policy as "positive neutralism."


Soviet leaders and Soviet publications invariably subscribe to Asian and African preference for the term "neutral," and avoid the use of the offensive epithet, "uncommitted." In deference to the sensitivity of these peoples, in this article they will be referred to as "neutral."

The ranks of Asian-African neutrals admit of considerable expansion, if we accept their own definition of what constitutes neutrality. Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya and Morocco, "committed" from the Western standpoint by the presence of United States bases on their territory, nevertheless regard themselves as "neutral" and "non-dependent." To demonstrate its neutrality, Morocco in August, 1959, sounded out the Soviet government for economic aid amounting to \$37.5 million to help balance the \$90 million advanced by the United States since Morocco became independent.

In their coverage of Asia and Africa in 1959, Soviet newspapers and periodicals have viewed conditions on these two continents with obvious, often with smug satisfaction. In Asia, and the Middle East, as they have

Formerly, editor (1946-1950) of *Soviet Press Translations*, published by the University of Washington's Far Eastern and Russian Institute, Ivar Spector is the author of *An Introduction to Russian History and Culture* (2nd edition). His latest work, *The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917-1958*, has just been revised and enlarged, with rare illustrations and maps included (University of Washington Press, Seattle, Washington). Dr. Spector made a trip to the Near East in the fall of 1958, where he interviewed leaders in politics and education.

¹ *Life*, July 20, 1959, p. 97.



—Department of State, Department of Defense and International Cooperation Administration, *Background for Mutual Security, Fiscal Year 1959*, Wash., D. C., U. S. Government Printing Office.

repeated *ad infinitum*, the death knell of colonialism has already sounded; only its vestiges remain in a few isolated areas, such as the sheikdoms of southern Arabia, Portuguese Goa and Dutch West Irian. Iraq, until July, 1958, regarded as a secure and stable member of the Western camp in the Middle East, evoked Soviet acclaim by its formal abandonment of the Baghdad Pact² on March 24, 1959, thereby upsetting the equilibrium of the Middle East Treaty Organization sponsored by the United States, and augmenting the ranks of Asian "neutrals."

Africa, in Soviet terminology the last citadel of imperialism, has been seething with anti-colonialism, with nationalist movements sprouting rapidly south of the Sahara. The explosive Algerian issue and French plans to carry out atomic tests in the Sahara have

continued to provide fuel for Soviet propaganda against French imperialism in North Africa. Even Morocco, echoed faintly by Libya, has been demanding the removal of United States bases and claiming neutrality in the cold war. In spite of occasional setbacks in the U.A.R. and Iraq, Soviet policy has won important strategic and economic advantages there. President Nasser publicly expressed his readiness to give the U.S.S.R. a second chance to cooperate. The Emperor of Ethiopia returned from a red-carpet visit to Moscow in August with a Soviet loan of \$100 million. In India, even the overthrow of the Communist state of Kerala failed to prevent the implementation of another Soviet loan of \$378 million.

In brief, although the U.S.S.R. boasted only three fully "committed" allies in all Asia and Africa—Red China, North Korea and North Vietnam—in 1959 it could well afford

² On August 18, 1959, the name of the Baghdad Pact was changed to the Central Treaty Organization because of Iraq's withdrawal.

to view with satisfaction the spread of neutralism, and to continue to promote the defection of such "committed" Western allies as Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. Neutral states, at least, were not members of the Western bloc.

The principal "trouble-maker" in Asia and Africa, according to the Soviet press, was the United States, which Moscow saddled with complete responsibility for the perpetuation of the cold war. Since the landing of United States troops in Lebanon in July, 1958, there has been no let-up in Soviet warnings to the neutral nations of Asia and Africa of the dangers inherent in what is now labelled the Dulles-Eisenhower Doctrine. United States efforts to resuscitate Meto (the Baghdad Pact without Baghdad), by the conclusion of bilateral agreements with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan on March 5, 1959, became the prime target of Soviet propaganda and evoked reiterated demands that Asia must become a "Zone of Peace." All Soviet propaganda beamed toward Asia and Africa has interpreted these agreements as a move by Washington to destroy the national liberation movements of the Middle East. Africans, both neutral and colonial, are being warned that their new "mortal enemy" is the United States, which is stepping in to fill the gap created by the retreat of the old "colonizers," seeking bases in return for economic aid. United States aid, in other words, is labelled just another instrument in the cold war. Not even the initial steps at Geneva in the direction of a summit meeting, United States Vice-President Richard Nixon's trip to the U.S.S.R., or preparations for the Eisenhower-Khrushchev talks in September, have produced any mellowing of Soviet propaganda against United States policy in Asia and Africa.

Prior to 1958, Soviet foreign policy *vis-à-vis* Asian neutrals rested on the twin pillars of ideology and nationalism. In spite of intensive Communist propaganda, however, the ideological results were by no means commensurate with the effort put forth. President Nasser has had the temerity to crush the Communist movements in the Egyptian and Syrian provinces of the U.A.R. In India, where the Communist state of Kerala in 1957 captured 35 per cent of the popular vote, Indian President Rajendra Prasad, on July

31, 1959, ousted the Communist government, as a result of chaos produced by Communist efforts to extend their control over private schools. In Indonesia, where large-scale civil war resulted from attempts to establish Communist influence in the government, President Sukarno, in reinstating the 1945 Constitution, has excluded known Communists from the Cabinet, and has left them heavily outnumbered by their opponents in the Provisional Supreme Advisory Council and the National Planning Council. Even in Iraq, Premier Abdul Karim Kassim showed signs of asserting his independence as far as Iraqi Communists were concerned.

Neutralist Thaw

Although Communist ideology had apparently failed to advance Soviet interests in Asia and Africa, Soviet sponsorship and support of nationalist movements, especially in the neutral Arab world, met with considerable success. In spite of the fact that the U.S.S.R. has not established a single independent Muslim state within its own borders, its perspicacity in posing as "the sole champion" of independent Muslim national states abroad elicited a warm welcome. In other words, Soviet success among the neutral nations of Asia and Africa since 1955 has been due, not to its so-called Communist system, but to its constant attack on colonialism and its unequivocal support of nationalist movements. Bulganin and Khrushchev set the tone in their trek through India, Burma and Afghanistan in 1955, when their theme song was "Down with Colonialism." N. A. Mukhitdinov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Council of Nationalities, in his visit to the U.A.R. in September, 1958, and other Soviet delegates to the Asian-African Conferences, have received the same warm response when they followed the same line. The "thaw" in the attitude of the neutrals toward the U.S.S.R. has spread, in one way or another, to most of the Arab world.

Although the Soviet regime has preached internationalism to the workers of the world, emphasizing that they have no fatherland but the U.S.S.R., in Asia and Africa they have discovered that nationalism is a much more potent weapon than any other "ism." Even during World War II, the Soviets found it more effective to appeal to the

Russian people in the name of nationalism, with slogans such as "*Otechestvennaya Voina*,"³ rather than in the name of Marxism, Leninism and communism. A cursory reading of material in Russian pertaining to the Chinese communes and Communist reforms suggests that the patience of the masses there and the progress achieved are in great measure due to the Red Chinese government's appeals to Chinese national pride.

Nationalism Promoted

As long as the U.S.S.R. is permitted to remain the foremost champion of nationalist causes in Asia and Africa, it is likely to continue to reap the benefits of this policy. To date, it shows no signs of abandoning this plank in its program for the neutral states:

1. In 1959, Soviet policy has become more crystallized with regard to the neutral nations. First, the unequivocal support of nationalist movements, heretofore so welcome to Asian and North African peoples, has been extended to the rest of Africa. The extension was keyed by a leading editorial in *Izvestia* (April 15, 1959), entitled "Africa Must Be Free." To African neutrals, the call for freedom and independence for 140 million "enslaved" Africans appears to sound as sweet as similar slogans did in Asia. With the Asian-African conferences as a basis for their activity, the Soviets are training native African leaders, as well as American Negroes, and many Soviet Muslims for work on that continent.

In the second place, now that most Asian countries have achieved national or political independence, the Soviet government, in 1959, is shifting its emphasis there to economic independence. Years ago, the Soviet programs for the Arab countries pointed out that political independence was not enough—that it must be followed by social transformation. Today, they are reiterating to all neutral nations of Asia and Africa, as well as to those they seek to detach from the Western bloc, that political independence cannot survive unless economic independence is assured. According to Soviet interpretation, economic independence means dissociation from the West, especially from the United States. The very term "Mutual Security

Program," under which provision is made for United States military and economic aid to developing countries, is interpreted in uneasy neutral lands, such as Morocco, to mean that the United States requires a *quid pro quo* in the form of a military commitment for the aid provided.

2. A substantial proportion of Soviet aid to the neutral nations has been allocated to the task of winning over the intellectuals of Asia and Africa. The time is long past when the Russians directed their propaganda primarily to the proletarians, to the poverty-stricken, illiterate masses in these lands. Today, they are after the leaders, after brains rather than brawn.

Almost any qualified student from Asian and African countries can obtain a scholarship in the U.S.S.R. This scholarship program does not include students sent by their own governments for study and training in the Soviet Union. Already an appreciable number of Indian intellectuals have gone to the U.S.S.R. because they found no jobs available in India. It is generally acknowledged that most of the leadership of the Communist party in India has been recruited from the high-born, since they are the ones who have received an education and who traditionally have provided the country with leadership. Their number includes E. M. S. Namboodiripad, formerly chief minister of the Communist state of Kerala, who is a Brahmin.

In President Sukarno's guided democracy in Indonesia, Professor Prijono, recently re-appointed as Minister of Education, is a 1954 Stalin Prize-Winner, who visited Moscow as recently as June, 1959. In July, the Kassim regime in Iraq, at least partially dependent on Soviet military and economic aid, sent a delegation to the Soviet satellite states of East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland, to recruit 150 professors to fill the gaps created by the withdrawal of Egyptian educators. A parliamentary delegation from the brand new republic of Guinea was feted in the U.S.S.R. in August, 1959, receiving almost as much publicity as Vice-President Nixon.

The Soviet government has other methods of attracting Asian and African intellectuals. As a regular feature of Soviet scholarly and popular magazines, articles by Asian and African leaders and writers are published

³ Denotation: War for the Fatherland; connotation: War for National Survival.

and their authors liberally remunerated. To cite but one example, the issue of *Sovremennyi Vostok* (*The Contemporary East*) for May, 1959, included an article by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Cambodian Royal Government, one by an Indian journalist, and others by Korean, Algerian and Indonesian Communist intellectuals.

The increasing number of Asian-African Conferences of writers, youth, cinema producers, economic specialists and so forth, held in 1958 and 1959 has afforded Soviet delegates ample opportunity to make contacts with intellectuals from the neutral nations. Some of these conferences have been held in Tashkent, in Soviet Central Asia. Here the Russians not only exchange ideas with Asian and African scholars, writers and journalists, but undertake to translate and publish their works, with generous royalties provided. At the Asian-African Conference of Writers in Tashkent, in October, 1958, the conferees agreed that the time was ripe for them to create a common hero for their novels and stories, thereby promoting the cause of understanding and peace. A Conference of Asian-African Women is scheduled to be held in Cairo in March, 1960.

The U.S.S.R. is far ahead of the United States in promoting such conferences among scholars and specialists. Whenever the Soviets manage to play a leading role in the preparation of the agenda, the conference becomes a platform for the denunciation of colonialism and imperialism, with the United States as the main target. Soviet cultural exchange agreements with the U.A.R., Iraq, India, and other Asian and African neutrals provide the Soviet Union with additional opportunities for impressing visiting intellectuals.

3. A careful analysis of Soviet economic aid to 18 countries from 1954 to 1959, to the tune of approximately \$2,384,000,000 (over \$1,000,000,000 of which was advanced in 1958), reveals that Soviet funds have been allocated to the neutrals primarily for industrial purposes. In addition to the \$100,000,000 advanced for the first section of the Aswan High Dam, which serves a twofold purpose, agrarian and industrial, Soviet aid to the U.A.R., especially in 1959, has helped Cairo to build ships, mines, airports, electric

power plants and a dairy (United Nations Report for June 21, 1959). The recent Soviet credit of \$378,000,000 to support the Third Indian Five-Year Plan was slated to cover nine projects, all of them industrial: the expansion of the Bhilai Steel Works, a heavy machine-building plant, mining equipment, fertilizer plants, newsprint, paper and printing machinery, aluminum smelting works, and new thermal plants. Since the Iraq Revolution, the U.S.S.R. has supported Kassim's first industrial development program, which includes 25 new plants for the manufacture of chemicals, farm machinery and electrical equipment, and plans are under way for a steel mill, glass works and a cement plant. The Soviet loan to Ethiopia in 1959 is designed to meet similar industrial requirements.

The Soviet economic aid program to the neutral nations of Asia and Africa appears to have two objectives—immediate and long range. The immediate objective is to create work for the unemployed and to make the recipients economically independent of the West. The long-range purpose—included as one of the objectives of the new Soviet Seven-Year Plan—is the creation of an industrial skilled labor class—an Asian-African proletariat.

Creating an Asian-African Proletariat

Post-Stalin relations of the U.S.S.R. with Muslim Asia and Africa have convinced the Soviet government that three factors have obstructed their efforts to bring the neutral nations into the Soviet orbit—local nationalism, Islam and the prevalence of an illiterate and inarticulate fellahin class, or its equivalent, which comprises the bulk of the population of these countries. The Soviets were able to lend outright support to the nationalist cause. Islam they could not support, nor could they win the fellahin and peasant masses, who represented Islam.

Originally, the Soviet purpose was to make the U.S.S.R. the mecca of technology *vis-à-vis* Asia and to provide Soviet aid abroad for the development of agriculture. Experience taught them that Islam was a barrier to headway along these lines. The poverty-stricken fellahin and peasant masses proved to be averse to change, difficult to uproot and opposed to organization. Industrial work-

ers, on the other hand, are more amenable to new ideas, can be readily transplanted to jobs in other locations, and succumb more quickly to regimentation.

In Soviet Russia, too, it was the peasant class that stood between the Bolshevik regime and Sovietization. One of the main objectives of the First Five-Year Plan in Russia was to overcome this obstacle, no matter what the cost in human suffering, by transforming peasants into industrial workers and creating a Soviet proletariat.

In the past few years, especially since 1955, Soviet aid and cultural propaganda have been directed toward making the masses of the neutral countries, first of Asia and now of Africa, technology-minded. In other words, by promoting industrialization on these continents, the Russians hope to accelerate the transformation of the fellahin class into a class of industrial workers. In proportion as technology and science assert themselves in Muslim countries, they believe that the hold of Islam will be weakened. Already in literature widely disseminated throughout Arabic lands, Soviet writers are utilizing the sputnik successes to point out that Soviet experiments have revealed the presence of neither God nor angels in outer space. Once the barrier created by Islam is broken, the U.S.S.R. expects to win over the industrial proletariat with comparative ease, as was the case in the Soviet Union itself. Moreover, the Russians expect the Asian industrial proletariat to prove an asset in the contest with bourgeois regimes. The bourgeoisie, according to Soviet thinking, is more afraid of the proletariat than of domination by serfs.

Thus, the three keys to Soviet policy today toward the neutral nations of Asia and Africa are support for nationalism, the winning of the intellectuals, and the transformation of the illiterate and unskilled peasants into an industrial proletariat. The attitude of the Soviet government toward the U.A.R., Iraq, and other regimes may fluctuate from time to time, with relations sometimes better, sometimes worse. The basic lines of Soviet policy are, nevertheless, clearly established. The overall objective is, of course, the inclusion of the neutral nations of Asia and Africa within the Sino-Soviet orbit, thereby not only breaching the Western encirclement of the

U.S.S.R., but accomplishing a Sino-Soviet encirclement of the West.

The Challenge to the U.S.

Soviet policy toward the neutral countries opens up a rare opportunity to the United States—an opportunity to stimulate and accelerate the development of a well-to-do agrarian class in Muslim lands. Whereas the U.S.S.R. is seeking to create an industrial class for which there is as yet no real basis, the masses of the people are already agrarian-minded. Instead of a nation of fellahin, all that is needed is to transform fellahin into independent, modern farmers.

This objective would meet with favorable response from Asian and African governments (monarchic and republican), which are seeking to accomplish the same thing, but on a far too limited scale. Prime Minister Nehru, addressing the Indian people on August 15, 1959, on the twelfth anniversary of Indian independence, clearly indicated the importance of this task: "India today faces a challenge of uplifting the vast masses of our people in the villages. The eyes of the world are focused on us to see how we meet this challenge."⁴ Agrarian aid on a substantial scale would be equally welcome to President Nasser. It would serve to stabilize the situation in Iran, where the Shah is a firm believer in agrarian reform, and would thus help to prevent the further disintegration of the Middle East Treaty Organization. The Shah was sorely tempted by the Soviet offer, in January, 1959, of a new non-aggression pact, including Soviet economic aid.

The evolution of a prosperous agrarian class would be a stabilizing factor, especially in the Middle East. Since its members are more tenacious of their religious beliefs, we could perhaps anticipate a Renaissance of Islam, instead of its destruction, as contemplated by the Soviet plan. Such a program would not involve the termination of technical and scientific aid so much in demand in the new nations of Asia and Africa. In fact, modern agriculture requires technological and scientific training as much as does industrial development.

It may seem ironic that the U.S.S.R.,

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⁴ *Overseas Hindustani Times*, August 20, 1959.

Although there is a slight relaxation of control in the Soviet bloc, this author notes that "Nevertheless, the balance of stability is delicate and the regimes are nervous over any phenomena that would in any way disturb the status quo and jeopardize the simultaneous socialist development of the Soviet bloc."

Soviet Policy in East Europe

By STEPHEN FISCHER-GALATI

Assistant Professor of History, Wayne State University

THE CURRENT guarded optimism about the thawing and possible evaporation of the cold war is totally unjustified in terms of Soviet policies in Eastern Europe. Indeed, Russian measures adopted since the promulgation of long-range plans at the Twenty-first Party Congress in January, 1959, reflect intensification rather than diminution in the fervor of the Communist offensive to "bury" the capitalist order. Whatever agreements might be reached through bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union or, conceivably, at a summit conference, would be entirely temporary from a Soviet standpoint. In Khrushchev's own words, they would settle at best such "particular" issues as the future status of Berlin, disarmament and related problems, but never the fundamental question of permanent coexistence of the socialist and capitalist systems on which there can be no com-

promise. Russia and her East European partners are irrevocably dedicated to achieving, through "peaceful" economic competition, as speedy a victory of communism throughout the world as possible.

However, the vastness of the ambitious campaign conducted by the socialist camp necessitates the conclusion of just such particular agreements. Russia and notably her satellites need time to expand and consolidate their economic structure and to strengthen their tenuous control over restive peoples. Hence any agreement on Khrushchev's favorite issues of disarmament, recognition by the United States of the permanency of the socialist order in Eastern Europe, and resumption of normal trade relations between the United States and the Soviet bloc would only contribute to the fulfillment of the long-range aims of the Communist nations and would represent a major victory for the Soviet Union.

It is now evident that the Berlin crisis was created by Khrushchev to force the United States and her partners into negotiation with the U.S.S.R. on issues broader than the German question. Close study of Soviet policies in Eastern Europe since the fall of 1958 reveal Khrushchev's immediate aims: Western recognition of the *status quo* in the satellite countries; relaxation of the armaments race and intensification of trade relations between East and West. Specific explanations for the adoption of these policies were offered at the Russian Communist Party Congress. In unequivocal terms, often repeated in recent months, the Party Secretary praised the achievements of the Soviet Union, "the most powerful country in the world Socialist system, and the first to enter

Before joining the faculty of Wayne State University in 1955, where he teaches Russian and East European history, Stephen Fischer-Galati was associated with the Department of State and the Mid-European Studies Center. He is the author of *Ottoman Imperialism and German Protestantism* (Harvard University Press) and of numerous articles on East European history. Dr. Fischer-Galati is also the principal contributor to and editor of the volume *Romania* (Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.) in the series, "East-Central Europe under the Communists."

a period of expanded construction of Communism," and urged rapid economic and cultural development of all countries in the socialist camp according to the Soviet pattern. This development should be more or less simultaneous because "economically backward countries, supported by the experience of other Socialist countries, by cooperation and mutual aid, quickly make up the time lost and raise their economy and culture, and thus the general line of economic and cultural development of all Socialist countries is levelled off."

The possibility of Russia's East European partners reaching the Soviet level by the end of the new Seven Year Plan in 1965 is, however, excluded in view of the "great variety of historical conditions" which preclude mechanical application of the Soviet example at this time. Nevertheless as "the general patterns and not their particular manifestations" are applied, rapid simultaneous development will be attained and the ultimate victory of the socialist camp assured. As the danger to consolidation and development under Soviet leadership rests in Titoist "revisionism" and American and German "imperialism," both responsible for the continuation of the cold war, they must be liquidated promptly and an atmosphere conducive to peaceful competition between the opposing systems be created through disarmament, recognition of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe and trade.

Economic Development

These pronouncements were immediately translated into concrete policies throughout the Soviet bloc. Primary emphasis was placed on economic development, industrial and agricultural. Most dramatic in this respect is the example of Bulgaria, an "economically backward" country, where the so-called "Big Leap" envisages unbelievable economic progress by 1963. Thus, for instance, production of coal would increase from the 12,730,000 tons of 1958 to 23,772,000, of electric power from 3,024,000,000 kilowatt hours to about 7,000,000,000, of steel from 210,000 tons to 400,000, of cement from 934,000 tons to 2,300,000, of canned vegetables from 79,000 tons to 228,000, of sugar from 149,000 tons to 384,000. Similarly spectacular increases are planned for

all branches of economic activity throughout the Soviet bloc.

Less formidable, but still impressive, are the goals of the new Polish Seven Year Plan (1959-1966). In certain areas, particularly heavy industry, the doubling, even tripling, of current production figures is envisaged. Examples, taken at random, indicate a planned production (by the end of 1956) of 75,000 tons of aluminium in contrast to the current output of 22,400, of 480,000 tons of nitrogenous fertilizers as against 227,500, of 9,000,000 tons of crude steel and 27,000,000 tons of brown coal instead of the current figures of 5,600,000 and 7,500,000 respectively. Among the other satellites Hungary and Czechoslovakia have set the most ambitious goals; they are, however, far more modest than the Bulgarian and Polish.

Industrial expansion is to be accompanied by more rapid collectivization in agriculture, especially in Hungary, Poland and Rumania where progress has been slow, and by more rigid adaptation of Soviet practices throughout the area. A sustained drive toward more rapid socialization in agriculture has been undertaken in Hungary with spectacular results publicized as early as April 16. The Communist organ *Nepszabadsag* announced on that date that the area of land in collective farms had nearly doubled in 1959. To the 848,000 hectares held by collectives at the end of 1958 the collectivization drive had added, by the end of March, another 811,000. In addition, almost 400,000 peasants had joined collective farms in the first quarter of 1959, nearly three times the 1958 total of 144,500. Somewhat more modest efforts are recorded in Rumania and Poland. In Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, the most advanced countries in terms of land socialization, Soviet practices have been adopted more rigorously particularly as they affect relations between machine tractor stations and collective farms and compulsory deliveries of agricultural products.

This relentless campaign for closer emulation of the Soviet economic model throughout the area naturally demands "greater sacrifices" from the population, particularly workers and peasants. Because voluntary cooperation was neither expected nor secured, the Communist regimes, including

Gomulka's, have been resorting more and more to "administrative" measures somewhat reminiscent of the Stalinist era. Most directly affected by this process have been the individual peasants in the countries of limited collectivization, the intellectuals, economic saboteurs and youth, all regarded as negative elements in one way or another.

The pressures exerted against the peasantry have consisted primarily in excessive taxation of individual property in all countries, the establishment of "cooperative villages" in Hungary, whereby the village governmental functions are entrusted to whatever collective farm might be in existence in a village regardless of the proportion of individual and socialized peasants in that village, and the prohibition of utilization of hired labor by individual farmers in Rumania. The Stalinist exposing of hostile elements, kulaks and others, has again become official dogma at least in Hungary and Rumania. In the latter country also reprisals are most severe against "economic saboteurs," the all encompassing group of "enemies of Socialist construction." More than anywhere else in the Soviet bloc sentences ranging from five years imprisonment to death have been imposed on "embezzlers," dishonest managers and employees of state-owned shops, and others guilty of economic crimes.

More profound in their implications are, however, the area-wide measures regarding intellectuals and youths. The comparative freedom of cultural expression permitted in the early years of the Khrushchev regime has been severely circumscribed with the new drive for economic development. From Poland to Bulgaria intensive campaigns are conducted to secure the unequivocal cooperation of all writers and artists in popularizing and glorifying the process of socialist construction. In general, writers and artists have been accused of anti-socialist trends, of betraying the principles of socialist realism, of failing to fulfill their mission of creating socialist culture on the Soviet pattern. The clearest expression of this position is contained in the Resolution of the Third Party Congress in Poland, dated March 21, 1959. The Party, it states,

struggles . . . for an art, particularly a literature . . . accessible to the working people, an art and literature expressing their social striv-

ings. . . . The successful implementation of the Party's cultural policies is at the present time encountering obstacles in the form of revisionist and bourgeois-liberal political tendencies—popular among creative circles—under whose influence there has appeared a certain number of works with harmful anti-Socialist ideological expressions. . . . The main task of the Party on the cultural front should be the final elimination of anti-Socialist influences and revisionist tendencies in creative milieus and organizations, as these tendencies are at present . . . the main obstacle in the socialist development of Polish Socialist culture. . . .

Cultural Restrictions

As the "elimination" of these adverse tendencies is being undertaken through "reasonable persuasion" in Poland, in the less moderate countries of the bloc the methods used for attaining socialist purity are more severe. In Czechoslovakia, for instance, several members of the Czechoslovak Writers' Union Central Committee were purged on the occasion of the Union's conference in March for "errors and confusion" of an anti-socialist nature. Shortly thereafter the important literary magazines *Novy Zivot* and *Kveten* were suspended for manifesting similar trends. Repeated demands for greater conformity, accompanied by threats, have appeared in Hungary and Rumania, while the Bulgarian Writers' Union assembled in Sofia, on May 29, adopted the slogan "Closer to Life, More Among the People" as the guiding light for a literary production that would "become even more closely united in its Marxist-Leninist position . . . in the need to intensify the struggle against bourgeois ideology and revisionism."

As a last step toward the establishment of a more perfect socialist order the satellite nations are rapidly adopting Khrushchev's educational philosophy of "polytechnicism," emphasizing on the job training in factory and farm in the system of secondary education. Already adopted in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, it is being readied for introduction in Rumania, Hungary and Albania. Polytechnicism is to be accompanied by more rigorous teaching of Marxism-Leninism throughout the educational system so that, in the categorical language of the Bulgarian Party paper *Rabotnichesko Delo*, "the entire educational training and work activities will

... instill the high moral principles of a Socialist society—fidelity to Communism and hatred of its enemies.”

The need for greater conformity and participation in socialist construction by youth is emphasized also by a substantial increase in “voluntary labor brigades” of boys and girls from the fifth grade through university level. While denouncing advanced students for entertaining “hostile, anti-social and demoralized attitudes,” the regimes, particularly in Czechoslovakia and Rumania, have applauded the record “voluntary” work on construction projects, road building, debris removing and other such activities by reliable elements found chiefly among the Pioneers (ages 9 to 15).

An Uneasy Rapport

It would be erroneous to assume, however, that the sacrifices imposed upon the various strata of the population have stimulated overt resistance or explosive situations comparable to the crises of 1956. On the contrary, it is evident that a tenuous *modus vivendi* between ruler and subjects has been established throughout the area largely because of gradual abandonment of Stalinist methods of terror. The satellite governments, moreover, have learned to combine moderation with determination in their relations with the principal “builders of Socialism,” the workers and the peasantry. Price reductions, increased social security benefits, greater distribution of consumer goods and better housing have been made available to workers required to increase productivity for achieving the new ambitious economic goals.

The unpopular principle of compulsory deliveries of agricultural products by collectivized peasants is being abandoned throughout the area. The methods of persuasion used to bring about “voluntary” collectivization have been made more palatable through the offering of greater economic incentive to individual peasants. Similarly, partly to placate the intellectual and professional groups—and partly for economic and propaganda reasons—the regimes are permitting limited contacts with the peoples and ideas of the West by promoting controlled tourism and cultural exchanges. Nevertheless, the balance of stability is delicate and the regimes are nervous over any

phenomena that would in any way disturb the *status quo* and jeopardize the simultaneous socialist development of the Soviet bloc. Understandably therefore, they have vociferously supported Khrushchev’s attacks against revisionism and imperialism and all related aspects of Soviet foreign policy. In some instances, notably in the case of Albania, Poland and Czechoslovakia, Russian concepts have been formalized and extended wherever revisionism and imperialism expressly affect their respective national interests.

Support for Soviet Policies

The satellites have been unanimous in demanding Western withdrawal from Berlin, acceptance of the Soviet terms on German unification and termination of the cold war by Western imperialists. The summation of this position was found in the “Appeal to European Public Opinion” issued by the conference of the members of the socialist camp held in Warsaw in July, which demanded a summit meeting, the recognition of the two German states, military disengagement in Central Europe and the Balkans, extended trade and cessation of propaganda activities directed against the socialist countries. More detailed statements have been issued repeatedly, stressing the impossibility of peaceful coexistence between East and West as long as “the aggressive character of the policy of reactionary circles in the U.S., whose principal ally in Europe is the German Federal Republic” persist. This quotation, from the Resolution of the Third Party Congress in Poland, further accuses the German Federal Republic of being “the main promoter of the cold war” and demands unconditional recognition by Germany and the West of “the eastern frontier of Germany . . . the Oder-Neisse,” abandonment of all territorial demands affecting Poland and “other Socialist countries,” and termination of all efforts by “aggressive imperialist circles” to thwart “peaceful coexistence with the Socialist world.”

This plea for the acceptance of Soviet goals, particularly as contained in the Rapacki Plan for disengagement in Central Europe, has been echoed in the Balkans by Albanian demands for the “transformation of the Balkan-Adriatic nations into a peace-

fully coexisting group." Reiterating Khrushchev's stand on an atom- and rocket-free Mediterranean and Balkan area, the Albanian government, in a special declaration issued in May, accused United States reactionary circles of warlike intentions and in general adapted the Polish arguments relative to Germany to the area adjacent to Albania.

Anti-Titoism

Albania also is at the forefront of the anti-revisionist, or anti-Titoist campaign. The Soviet bloc, bent on conformity and simultaneous development, has been tireless in its attacks against Tito's independent policies. The Yugoslav leader is regarded not only as a tool of Western imperialism but, more significantly, as a main and immediate obstacle to the much desired homogenization of the socialist camp. The satellite campaign against Tito does not urge peaceful coexistence, as such would be anomalous among socialist nations, but is rather designed to persuade the "heretic" of the necessity to accept the pattern of socialist development established by Khrushchev at the Twenty-first Party Congress. The most persistent apprehension regarding Tito, and for that matter also the "Western imperialists," is the impact that anti-Soviet bloc propaganda emanating from these sources might have on the inhabitants of the several satellite nations. It is for this reason that the East European press has been particularly virulent in its support of Soviet demands for cessation of propaganda activities by the West in Berlin, the unconditional recognition of the socialist camp, and the acceptance of the principle of nuclear-free "peace zones" in Central Europe and the Balkan area. It is for this reason too that the press methodically refutes any Yugoslav aspersions on the Marxian propriety of socialist measures taken by the Eastern European bloc under the guidance of the Soviet Union.

It is indeed significant that the leaders of Hungary and Rumania, countries affected by the survival of pro-Western sentiments, and of Albania, the isolated member of the Soviet bloc, find it necessary to issue repeated warnings about continuing American and Titoist subversion and occasionally, (as in the case of Hungary) register formal diplomatic pro-

tests against "the untenable situation arising from the continual subversive activity of the American Legation . . . and of illegal American organizations operating against the State and the social order in the People's Republic." Such actions, combined with attacks against "rotten bourgeois nationalism" in Rumania, trials of "spies and saboteurs" in Albania and Hungary and even arrests, in Czechoslovakia, of individuals disseminating anti-socialist views acquired by listening to Radio Free Europe, go a long way toward explaining the eagerness of the East European regimes to terminate the cold war on Khrushchev's terms.

The other Soviet desideratum, disarmament, would seem (other than for strategic considerations) less important to the satellites, although undoubtedly the achievement of this goal would facilitate the economic development now envisaged. The bloc countries' military production and establishments are infinitesimal compared to the Soviet; thus the budgetary allocations for military purposes even if released to other branches of the economy would not materially facilitate achievement of plans ahead of schedule. On the other hand, armaments reductions in the U.S.S.R. would allow greater flexibility in Soviet assistance to her partners.

Similarly, a sizeable increase in trade between Russia and the United States would make easier the economic integration of the Soviet bloc and the simultaneous socialist development of the area. Nevertheless, Khrushchev's requests for expansion of trade have been assigned a lower priority than cessation of "hostile activities against the Socialist nations." The only significant plea was made at the meeting of the Soviet bloc economic organization, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, held in Tirana in May, 1959. At that time, following the adoption of routine measures designed to integrate the economic plans of the area with the master Soviet Seven Year Plan, it was requested that Russia's position on expansion of trade between East and West be given top publicity throughout the area.

Regardless of assigned priorities, however, Russia's East European partners have consistently supported Soviet foreign policy. Any other course of action is not only impossible

in terms of their relations with the Soviet Union but also unrealistic. The destinies of the East European nations are firmly linked to those of the U.S.S.R. and Soviet foreign policy is to a considerable extent indeed determined by Russia's relations with her partners in Eastern Europe. Were it not for the closeness of this interrelationship, the Soviet Union would probably stress disarmament and trade in her negotiations with the West. But her insistence on the recognition of the socialist order in Eastern Europe, on the abandonment of propaganda activities by the West and on the formal acceptance of the

present frontiers of her client states clearly reflects the continuing significance attached by Khrushchev to the maintenance and rapid simultaneous development of the socialist camp in Eastern Europe. Convinced that peaceful coexistence between the socialist and capitalist systems would ultimately result in the victory of the former, the Soviet Union is striving to achieve the ideal conditions within the Soviet bloc that would insure that victory. Retrenchment in Eastern Europe or any other basic alteration of Khrushchev's interpretation of Marxism-Leninism is out of the question.

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which until recently was basically an agrarian country, should seek to create a technological and industrial proletariat in Muslim lands, and that the United States, the most developed country in the world from the standpoint of technology, should seek to create nations of farmers. Under present circumstances, there would appear to be little, if any, alternative.

Technologically, we are not likely to be able to compete with the U.S.S.R. in the neutral areas of Asia and Africa, in addition to our other obligations, at a time when Congress is in a mood to slash mutual aid and development programs. Agrarian aid would prove less costly, would produce more lasting results, and would win the support and acclaim of the peoples and their governments. Above all, it would be a positive program, with a definite goal, which would go appreciably beyond our present, somewhat negative stand for the "containment of Communism." Since Asia and Africa may well be the arena of decision in the contest be-

tween freedom and totalitarianism in the world as we know it, it therefore seems imperative that the United States should assume the initiative in promoting the development of a stable middle class, primarily an agrarian middle class of well-to-do farmers, to replace the masses of landless peasants before they are transformed by Soviet tactics into a proletariat and become an easy prey to demagogues.

The ultimate success of United States policy *vis-à-vis* that of the U.S.S.R. in the neutral countries of Asia and Africa, irrespective of whether economic aid be allocated to agrarian or industrial development, or to both, will be contingent upon our official and unequivocal support for nationalist movements on these two continents, so long as their leaders and governments pursue a policy of peace. Nationalism is so strong a factor and its adherents so sensitive, that failure to support it will render any amount of economic aid virtually useless. The United States can no longer afford to permit the U.S.S.R. to remain the foremost champion of Asian and African nationalism.

"... The territory of Turkey is a link between many regions and a crossroads for many cultures, as well as a point where diverse political and economic schools of thought face each other. Both by location and idealistic aspirations she is a European country, constituting a portion of the Balkan and the Mediterranean areas; but she is also a Middle Eastern country which is vitally concerned with developments that take place in the area.

"... Turkey dominates the defense of the Mediterranean as well as of southeastern Europe, and also commands the Straits where the Mediterranean is joined to the Black Sea which is dominated by Soviet Russia."

—*Fatin Rustu Zorlu, Foreign Minister of Turkey, an address delivered July 1, 1959.*

"Soviet policy toward Peking in the cold war is primarily directed toward using the Communist Chinese for expansion into Southeast Asia," writes this specialist, who notes that "the most serious implementation of that policy is now occurring in Laos, through the teamwork of the Soviet Union, Communist China, North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao."

Soviet Plans for Peking

By PETER S. H. TANG

*Executive Director of the Research Institute on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, Inc.,
Washington, D.C.*

IN THE early years of the Truman administration, the gilt chipped off our "strange" wartime alliance with the Soviet Union, giving rise to what has been known as the cold war. The Soviet Union's prime ally in this struggle for supremacy—on the brink, but short of a general war—has been the Chinese Communists, even before the latter established their regime in Peking in 1949. The Russian over-all objectives of the cold war are to split the Western allies, allay the fears of the "neutrals" or uncommitted nations, and thereby advance the cause of world communism: to attempt to achieve an easy victory without resorting to exhaustive wars. The West has found itself, as a result, in a constant psychological battle with the Soviet Union in an effort to "win the minds of men." Each Russian threat, bluff or aggression tests the strength of the West in a war of nerves.

While the Russians attempt to use the classic technique of "divide and conquer" on

the Western allies, they realize that if the forces of communism are to be successful in the cold war, the solidarity of their own camp must be assured. The size and strength of Communist China, as well as the Soviet need for a powerful ally, preclude assigning her a place in the bloc as a mere Soviet satellite. Therefore, in February, 1955, shortly after the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to Peking, former Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov declared the Chinese People's Republic to be the co-leader of the "Socialist" camp, or the Sino-Soviet bloc. China was made responsible, along with the Soviet Union, for the internal solidarity of the bloc as well as for the furtherance of its external aims. In 1956, bloc solidarity was shaken by the repudiation of Stalin, and the Polish and Hungarian revolutions. By virtue of the role of Communist Premier Chou En-lai as mediator between Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev and First Secretary of the Polish Communist party Wladyslaw Gomulka, China merited her title as co-leader.

The Soviet willingness to accept the conciliatory approach and good offices of the Chinese indicates the application of their policy to maintain bloc solidarity. The Russians are inclined to accept certain beneficial influences from the Chinese Communists, not only to overcome a current crisis, but in order to foster a long-range orientation for the smooth working of bloc relationships. The Chinese are in agreement with

Former attaché to the Chinese Embassy in Moscow from 1943 to 1945, Peter S. H. Tang is a member of the faculty of the Georgetown University Graduate School, in addition to his duties with the R.I.S.S.B. He is the author of *Communist China Today: Domestic and Foreign Policies* (Frederick A. Praeger, 1957) and *Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia* (Duke University Press, 1959).

* Research for this article was made possible through grants from the American Council of Learned Societies and the American Philosophical Society. The author was assisted by the staff of the Research Institute on the Sino-Soviet bloc.

this policy and are anxious to encourage compromise in order to achieve this end. In December, 1956, Chinese Communist party leader Mao Tse-tung established his position on a "separate road to socialism": deviations from Soviet experience, according to local conditions, would be accepted in internal policy, but the solidarity of the camp in external affairs must be maintained at all costs. Thus the Chinese would support Gomulka, but not Nagy or Tito. In this statement of December 28, "More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," Mao said: "All the experience of the Soviet Union, including its fundamental experience, is bound up with definite national characteristics and no other country should copy it mechanically."

Having overcome this crisis and having established a basis for strengthening the unity of the world Socialist system, the Soviets and Chinese sought to institutionalize this within an organizational framework. Thus at the celebration of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in November, 1957, the concept of a Socialist Commonwealth¹ (which had previously been alluded to in official statements), was formalized in the "Declaration of the Conference of the Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries."

The Socialist states are united into one *sodruzhestvo* (commonwealth), by having entered upon the common path to socialism, by a common class substance of their social and economic system and state authority, and by the need for mutual support and aid, by a community of interests and objectives in the struggle against imperialism for the victory of socialism and communism, and by a Marxist-Leninist ideology common to them all.

This Declaration was signed by all the Socialist nations except Yugoslavia, who objected to the return to orthodoxy (at least in foreign policy) that this signified. This internal strengthening of the world Socialist system also strengthens the bloc's position *vis à vis* the West in the cold war. For it is obvious that their minor internal differences must be settled in order to present a united front to the world on matters of foreign

policy. The Declaration also sets out a prototype for international Communist cooperation and agreement in such cold war incidents as have occurred in Laos, India and Taiwan. The Russians gave high praise to Gomulka at a recent Polish reception in September, 1959, indicating their basic approval of the Chinese approach to harmony within the bloc.

A Strong Moscow-Peking Axis

The Russians have taken pains to point out the solidarity of the Socialist bloc in general and the lasting strength of the Moscow-Peking Axis in particular to the Western world. The speculations of Western journalists that there may be rifts in the Axis have been angrily denounced as slanderous attacks by both the Soviet Union and Communist China. Their past and present close cooperation and coordination of aims and policies illustrate that their words must indeed be taken seriously. The most evident example of Soviet policy toward Communist China is her desire to accept Peking as a co-leader of the bloc, in order that the bloc may be strengthened and unified to fight the West in this psychological struggle. Communist China helps the Soviet Union strengthen her position at home and abroad.

In view of the foregoing account, it is evident that the Soviet Union and Communist China are in basic agreement upon the policies to be pursued in waging the cold war. Communist China adds to the Soviet voice in aiming propaganda at the West: denouncing the United States as an "imperialist" and a "paper tiger," condemning our military alliances, nuclear testing, *ad infinitum*. China, as a former real object of Western imperialism, is in a better position than the Soviet Union to further the Soviet policy of exploiting the nationalism and the hatred of colonialism in the Asian and African nations. Furthermore, China serves as a shining example to the underdeveloped nations of the rapid economic progress that can be made under a Communist planning system. The Russians find it desirable to build up the Chinese economy through aid and trade programs, in order that China can play a leading role in the "peaceful competition" that Khrushchev advocated in his article for the October, 1959, *Foreign*

¹ For a detailed discussion of Soviet policy and the Socialist Commonwealth see Kurt L. London, "The 'Socialist Commonwealth of Nations'" to be published soon. The present writer is indebted to Dr. London for the privilege of reading his article before publication.

Affairs. They also "point with pride" to the fact that Soviet aid programs are designed solely for economic development and have no "strings" attached.

In line with the Soviet policy of considering Communist China an equal within the bloc and an ally in the cold war struggle, the Russians allow Peking to exercise sole control over all China. They want the Communist party of China to have a free hand within China and to have all the domain to which she is entitled. The Russians, therefore, were in agreement with the Tibetan repression, since they agree that Tibet is an integral part of China. Their propaganda has stressed, as has the Chinese, that this is a domestic matter, and that no nation, whether neutral or committed, has the right to object, much less attempt to bring this before the United Nations. The Soviet Union illustrated this same policy toward China when China was allowed to retain control over Sinkiang and when the Russians returned to her control Port Arthur, Dairen and the Chinese-Changchun Railway.

Soviet use of the "China issue" in the United Nations serves to add fuel to a constant war of nerves in that organization. Each year, the Russians challenge the credentials of the Nationalist Government of China on Taiwan, instead proposing that the Communist Government on the mainland be seated. Each year, thus far, they have been outvoted in the Security Council, the General Assembly and the other constituent bodies within the United Nations. Although the Soviet Union has not staged a walkout in the Security Council or the General Assembly since they erred in doing so prior to the Korean War, Soviet representatives have walked out on the meetings of the smaller bodies when the Nationalist Government's representative was seated. The issue is thus kept before the world by the Soviets, splitting the non-Communist nations into two groups: those who have extended diplomatic recognition to the Chinese People's Republic and want her seated in the United Nations and those who have not recognized her and refuse to have her seated. The former group includes the neutral or uncommitted nations. The Soviet Union loses no opportunity to praise the willingness of these nations to include Communist China

in the United Nations and to condemn the "Chiang Kai-shekists" who want her excluded.

On August 11, the Russians gave great praise to the Indian stand that the Chinese People's Republic should be admitted to the United Nations. The Soviet Union did not care to note, however, that India's persistent eagerness to have Communist China in the United Nations (despite recent controversies over border disputes) rose out of Nehru's intention of winning Peking's friendship, and his reasoning that the Chinese can be called to account for their actions in Tibet, Laos and the Indian border regions only when Communist China becomes a member of the United Nations.

The Soviet veto power in the Security Council has become a symbol of the cold war. Although the "Uniting for Peace Resolution" and the recent formation of a United Nations Commission to investigate the situation in Laos (despite the Soviet veto) have reduced the impact of the veto, it is likely that the Soviet Union will continue to use this weapon in behalf of her Communist China partner as well as herself. If Communist China were to be admitted to the United Nations, her additional voice and veto would be convenient for the Communist bloc, as well as adding prestige and another voice to the bloc. Soviet policy can utilize Communist China in the cold war, whether she is in or outside of the United Nations.

Expansion in Southeast Asia

It is the over-all policy of the Soviet Union to serve the cause of communism and world domination with all available means. At the present time, the Soviet Union and Communist China are implementing their joint policy by expansion into Southeast Asia. The prevailing atmosphere among the uncommitted nations of this region is one of a desire for peaceful coexistence. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization is still in its infancy, and is far from being a strong defensive organization like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Seato has a very small following and has no standing army. Southeast Asia, therefore, is the point of least resistance in the free world to the Communist menace. It is particularly susceptible to Communist Chinese maneuvering because

of geographical proximity, racial similarities and cultural affinities. Therefore, Communist China serves as the primary vehicle of Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. The Russians are ready to give moral and material support to the Chinese, since this expansionism enhances the Soviet as well as the Chinese position in the area.

As has been mentioned, it is to the advantage of the Soviet Union to have the former oppressed, semi-colonial Asian nation of China take the lead in exploiting the awakened nationalism of Asia and Africa. Communist expansion into South and Southeast Asia has not been the result solely of military aggressions. With the presence of the power, prestige and influence of Communist China nearby, the Soviet goal of neutralizing these nations politically, economically and militarily, in order to check the free world, has become much more effective.

It has been Soviet policy to launch an economic and cultural "peaceful offensive" into Southeast Asia in the hope of winning friends for the Communist bloc and deterring possible adherence to a hostile group. Within this general framework, the Chinese have been in a better position to implement this policy on their own behalf or as a front for their Soviet ally. Far from competing with the Communist Chinese, the Russians encourage them to conclude trade and economic aid agreements with the nations of Southeast Asia. Winning Japan away from the United States has been a prime goal. But intimidations and threats can be applied at will through territorial claims and Communist infiltration. The Russians have supported Chinese denunciation of the Kishi government as well as China's breaking off economic and cultural relations after the Japanese government refused to allow the Communist Chinese to fly their flag over the trade mission in Tokyo. By this, the Soviet Union, in conjunction with Peking, is apparently trying to force Japan eventually to recognize the Communist regime in China.

The Soviet policy of cultural offensive has been particularly useful, since this enables the Communists to reach the intellectuals as well as the masses. China, as an Asian nation, again is in an excellent position to make this policy effective for both herself and the U.S.S.R. Cultural exchanges have been

arranged between the various Asian countries and Communist China. Exhibits, operas, students, and so forth, are exchanged. The Russians hope that this will facilitate the infiltration of Asia and its eventual fall to the Communists. In pursuit of this, the Chinese are also urged to gain the loyalty and support of the Overseas Chinese, so that they may serve to multiply local Communist influences.

The local Communist parties in Southeast Asia, guided or directed by Moscow and Peking, serve to allow political infiltration by the Communists. They represent a useful device to create an international united front and thus further Communist expansion. In the neutral countries, the Communist parties have been directed to co-operate with the local governments as long as they maintain a neutral policy and do not accept Western aid. During the Tibetan crisis, the Indian Communist party came out as an avowed agent of a foreign power. Although this Party had been primarily controlled by Moscow, the Russians have now seemingly assigned Peking the responsibility for managing the Indian Communists.

The Russians have also encouraged the Chinese to advocate the principle of "peaceful coexistence." At the Bandung Conference in 1955, Chou En-lai and India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru enunciated the "five principles of peaceful coexistence" (embodying ideas which had previously been discussed in the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.) on which Communist policy in the Afro-Asian countries is theoretically based. Coinciding with the traditional Indian concept of the *Panch Shila*, the so-called principles of peaceful coexistence have been twisted and capitalized on by the Communist bloc in order to gain the sympathy and support of the "neutrals" for their appeals and policies in the cold war against the free world, especially the United States.

Khrushchev gave the idea of peaceful coexistence a new push in his article in the October, 1959, issue of *Foreign Affairs*. He called for the end of the cold war and for replacing it with peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition, as part of his "peace offensive." The Russians add their voice to that of the Chinese Communists in advocating this policy, even if it is not carried out by

their deeds, since the Afro-Asian nations, as a matter of necessity, are so strongly in favor of it. Thus any of the recent expansionist incidents in the Far East are blamed upon the imperialist warmongers in the United States, who are charged with fomenting attacks against the Socialist peace-loving nations.

Although Asians have looked askance at this explanation of the Tibetan blood bath, the fighting in Laos and the clashes in Indian border regions, the stated principles of peaceful coexistence undoubtedly will not be abandoned but will continuously be hailed by the Soviet Union itself (and through Communist China) during this period of seemingly deteriorating relations with the "neutrals." This situation illustrates the Russian policy of interchanging by itself or through Peking, a "hard" line with a "soft" one, and sometimes using both simultaneously, by one or both of the two respective countries.

Russia and China versus India

The latter tactic is being illustrated in the present Sino-Indian border incidents. While the Chinese Communists provoke the Indians with a mailed fist, the Soviets adopt velvet glove tactics: advocating peaceful settlement between these two nations without interference from the West. The area in question in the Northeast Frontier Agency and Ladakh has long been disputed between the Chinese and Indians. The Chinese have never accepted the McMahon Line.² The Soviets pose as a neutral arbiter, although they actually support China on this issue. The incident will become more than a border dispute, however, if the Chinese are directed to attack Bhutan and Sikkim. Though declaring that an attack on these protectorates will be considered an attack on India itself, Nehru

has repeatedly ruled out war and emphasized peaceful settlement.

It is the over-all policy of the Russians, in accordance with the dictum of Lenin, eventually to gain control of the populous Indian subcontinent. The present Chinese Communist cold war with Nehru is designed to force the Indians to a position that the Chinese consider just. China is now strong enough to reassert her position in the remote border areas, using as pretexts the need of sealing off the Tibetan border to prevent rebels from escaping and their displeasure with Nehru for giving the Dalai Lama asylum. Thus, again, the Chinese are advancing the Soviet policy of Communist expansion.

Invasion of Laos

Ever since the inception of the cold war, the Soviet Union has been somewhat successfully prevented from expanding into Europe any further, by the determination of the Allies. Therefore it is likely that her policy is to allow Communist China to enhance their joint position in Asia by expansion into that area. The most serious implementation of that policy is now occurring in Laos, through the teamwork of the Soviet Union, Communist China, North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao. None of the first three need to be in the forefront, since they are making full use of the Pathet Lao. Laotian Premier Phoui Sananikone, however, does claim that there are North Vietnamese troops at the scene of the fighting in Phongsaly and Samneua. The United States has blamed the Soviet Union and Communist China for the invasion in Laos.

It is possible that Russian policy is to entrust Communist China with the responsibility for this chain operation among Communist allies. The Soviet Union appears to have set the stage for this expansion as early as December, 1958. At that time, the Soviet Union concluded a trade agreement with North Vietnam, according to *Pravda* of December 30 (1958); although *Pravda* does not mention it, it is likely that this included arms shipments which are now finding their way into the hands of the Pathet Lao. Since January, 1959, *Pravda* and *Izvestia* have repeatedly accused Laos and South Vietnam of being in collaboration with the Chinese Nationalists to endanger not only the Pathet

² The McMahon Line forms the border between the Northeast Frontier Agency of India, and Tibet and China. It is named after Henry McMahon, the British delegate to the Simla conference, which resulted in the British-Tibetan-Chinese Convention of July, 1914. Although the McMahon Line was accepted by the British (and subsequently the Indians) and the Tibetans, China never ratified the Convention and has never accepted the Line as defining her borders. However, the Chinese were not strong enough to challenge the Line until the 1951 invasion of Tibet (which had been strong enough to be independent in fact from 1912 to 1951). Since the Communist Chinese occupied positions close to the McMahon Line, various border incidents occurred as well as a widespread circulation of maps showing China's border as being situated far to the South of the McMahon Line. The recent incursions into India seem to indicate that now, after 45 years, China may be seriously challenging the McMahon Line.

Lao, but the North Vietnamese and Communist Chinese regimes as well. On January 18, 1959, *Izvestia* charged that it was not the Vietnamese troops that crossed the border into Laos, but "it was the Laotian troops which invaded Viet-Nameese territory." On May 15, *Izvestia* stated that

all the violations [of the Geneva Agreements] are actually connected with the activities of American military personnel in South Vietnam and with the U. S. policy of turning South Vietnam into a U. S. military springboard against the Chinese People's Republic and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

It would seem that the Russians were paving the way for the intervention of the North Vietnamese and Chinese Communists in Laos and possibly even South Vietnam, in time. On May 20, *Pravda* declared: "China obviously cannot remain indifferent to the serious actions of the Royal Laotian Government that are directed at complete rejection of the Geneva agreements and that threaten peace in Indochina." The Soviets thus gave the Chinese the "green light" to go ahead in their expansion into Laos.

Peking followed the Soviet lead in propaganda, stating on August 31, 1959:

The United States bellicose group's policies of aggression, expansion and threats of war are encountering ever stronger opposition among the people of the world. Now, the United States is whipping up tension in Indochina in an attempt to convert Laos into one of its military bases and drag that country step by step into the Seato military bloc. The United States overtly instigated the Phoui Sananikone government of Laos to tear up the Geneva agreements and extend the civil war provoked by them. This United States move poses a grave threat to peace in Southeast Asia and the world.

The U.S.S.R. and Laos

That it is Soviet policy to expand into Laos is further indicated by the fact that North Vietnam President Ho Chi-Minh made a trip to Moscow to confer with Khrushchev prior to his visit to Peking to confer with Mao. Soviet policy is to avoid direct involvement in the conflict, while shielding her Chinese and Vietnamese allies through propaganda and in the United Nations.

The numerical strength of the Communist

Chinese has also been of value to the Soviet Union in implementing its cold war foreign policy. The Chinese population has been used in peace movement appeals, human sea tactics such as in the Korean War, for skilled labor in places like Outer Mongolia and reportedly for forced labor on construction projects in the Soviet Union and satellite countries.

The skillful Russian coordination of foreign policy with technological progress, scientific development and economic growth impresses her Chinese ally and assures its loyalty and admiration. This was illustrated by the successful launchings of Sputnik on October 4, 1957 and Lunik II on September 12, 1959. Sputnik reassured the Chinese of the strength of Soviet leadership after the manifestations of internal unrest in the bloc that were illustrated by the Volkuta uprising in the U.S.S.R. and the Polish and Hungarian Revolutions of 1956. The Chinese now believe the Soviet Union to be ahead of the United States in technological advancement; their loyalty to the Soviet Union is increased by this great psychological impact. Therefore, the Russians are in a better position to strengthen the solidarity of the bloc. Soviet technology has further convinced the Chinese of the quality of Soviet leadership.

China as a Soviet Tool

Soviet policy toward Peking in the cold war is primarily directed toward using the Communist Chinese for expansion into Southeast Asia. The Russians create the opportunity for them to do this and then shield them from Western wrath. Feeling that what is gained by Communist China is a gain for the entire bloc; the two have a community of interests. Therefore the Russians give loud support to Chinese "domestic" policy—Tibet, Taiwan, and possibly as an extension, the Indian border disputes—while using her to support if not implement Soviet foreign policy. Communist China in turn supports the Soviet Union—on Berlin, nuclear testing—and adds her voice to the anti-Western propaganda campaign. It is to the advantage of the Soviet Union to coordinate policies with Communist China and give her moral and material support in their common struggle through "peaceful competition" in the cold war.

"... 'The end to the cold war' in Khrushchev's terminology amounts really to the conduct of the cold war on Soviet terms." This author concludes that "For as long as the non-Communist world remains able and willing to put up resistance to the professed Soviet aim to take over the world, the cold war must go on."

Soviet Policy and World Conquest

By HANS J. MORGENTHAU

*Director, Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy,
University of Chicago*

WHAT is it that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union seeks to accomplish? The answer to that query has baffled the United States ever since the cold war started. A decade ago, the United States had two alternatives: Communist world conquest and the traditional goals of Russian imperialism in Eastern and Central Europe, the eastern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. The original policy of containment was based on the assumption that the latter answer was correct, and it sought in consequence to deter the Soviet Union from expanding both through the threat of general atomic retaliation and through the strengthening of local military forces.

The shock of the North Korean aggression brought about a reinterpretation of the policy of containment. For that aggression was interpreted as the opening shot, which the Soviet Union had fired by proxy, in a military campaign to conquer the world. The Korean war was seen in the context of Com-

munist world conquest, as an initial limited and probing operation pursuant to a master plan which envisaged the military conquest of the world. In consequence of this interpretation, the United States transformed the original policy of containment limited to the traditional objectives of Russian expansion into a total one, which threatened massive retaliation anywhere and sought to fashion a world-wide network of military alliances commensurate with the assumed world-wide military threat.

There is no empirical evidence to support this interpretation of the Korean war, and what empirical evidence there is points to a different interpretation. It is much more likely that in 1950 the North Korean government was as eager to unite the country by marching south as the South Korean government was eager to unite it by marching north. While the United States was willing and able to restrain the South Koreans, the Soviet Union seems to have given the North Koreans a free hand, after having been assured that there was no risk of American intervention. When events proved this assurance to be fallacious, the general who had been the Russian pro-consul in North Korea was dismissed and appeared but recently from oblivion. Within the over-all context of Soviet foreign policy, the Korean war is likely to have been an accident, the unintended result of an isolated miscalculation rather than part of a grand design for world conquest.

Hans J. Morgenthau was born and educated in Germany. He has taught in many universities in the United States and Europe. During 1956-1957, he was Visiting Professor of Political Science at Yale and Columbia Universities. His latest books include *Scientific Man vs. Power Politics*, *Politics among Nations*, and *In Defense of the National Interest*. He has also served as consultant to the Department of State. Mr. Morgenthau is Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago, and Research Associate, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research.

Stalin's Power Politics

Stalinist foreign policy, then, was essentially traditional in its objectives and even in its methods. The opportunities for espionage

and subversion which the Communist movements in foreign countries provided were eagerly exploited, yet they were exploited with complete cynicism as means to the traditional ends of Russian power. Russian foreign policy in the 1930's and 1940's was in the classic tradition of power diplomacy. The temporary reliance upon the League of Nations, the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1935, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, the support of General Chiang Kai-shek during World War II and its immediate aftermath, the conquest of Eastern Europe, the attempts to gain a foothold on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean and in Iran and to draw all of Germany into the Russian orbit owe nothing to communism, but everything to the traditional objectives and techniques of Russian foreign policy. The exploitation of the loyalty of foreign Communists made it easier for the Soviet Union to attain some of these objectives, but neither the choice of the objectives nor their attainment was determined by the fact that the Russian ruler who made the choices and proved capable of attaining much of what he had chosen, professed the political philosophy of communism and pretended to act in its name.

This, then, is the paradox of Stalin's foreign policy which must have been congenial to his sense of sardonic humor: he spoke the language of doctrinaire Marxism and founded his charismatic leadership upon the pretense of executing and developing the teachings of Marx and Lenin, while in fact the objectives and techniques of his foreign policy owed everything to the Russian tradition going back to Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great and were indebted to communism only for their ideological justifications and rational isolation.

The foreign policy of Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev presents a paradox of a different sort. Much less a doctrinaire Communist than his predecessors, he has set out to accomplish the world-wide triumph of communism not as the heir of Marx and Lenin, but as the pragmatic competitor of the United States. He has set out to do what Lenin and Stalin never attempted: to defeat the foremost capitalist nation at its own game of technological and productive achievements. In the measure that Khrushchev

succeeds in this endeavor, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union takes on an ideological complexion different from the verbal tributes which Stalin used to pay to the infallibility of Marx and Lenin. These tributes were essentially in the nature of a theological ritual. The truth was found ready-made in the holy scriptures of communism and superimposed upon a reality which had to be forced into the Procrustes' bed of the doctrine. Khrushchev's Communist truth is derived from an experience whose reality is beyond doubt and truly impressive: the fact of Russian technological and productive achievements. And these achievements are attributed to the superiority of the Communist organization of society.

Thus communism as a universal principle of social organization gains from actual performance a prestige which Stalin's barren exercise in dialectic theology could never give it. The Communist prophets from Marx to Stalin had to argue philosophically for the foreordained triumph of communism, the Communist salvation of mankind which would inevitably occur in however a distant future. Khrushchev can point to what has already occurred as a token of the correctness of that prophecy. His predecessors were like Moses who had to maintain the faith in the Promised Land without empirical evidence to support that faith. Khrushchev can be likened, as it were, to a half-way Joshua who strengthens the faith of the faithful and wins proselytes by calling attention to the foothold which he has actually gained in the Promised Land.

This radical change in the relationship between Communist promise and Communist performance has brought forth a radical change in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Soviet imperialism, which in Stalin's day was, and had to be, of a limited military character—for here were its only opportunities—has become under Khrushchev both demilitarized and unlimited. Khrushchev's new imperialism seeks to conquer the world neither with military might nor with the gospel of Marx and Lenin, but with the technological and productive capacity of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev proposes to fight that battle on three different fronts. He offers the Soviet Union to the other nations of the world as a model to emulate, and

especially to those who are under-developed and uncommitted. He seeks to spread the influence of the Soviet Union through foreign aid and trade. By overtaking the United States in technological and productive achievements, he attempts to reduce the United States to the status of a second-rank power. This is what Khrushchev has in mind when he defines the relations between the United States and Soviet Union in terms of "peaceful" or "competitive co-existence."

The specific foreign policies which the Soviet Union has been pursuing in recent years serve directly or indirectly this over-all goal. Some of these policies are new—such as development of foreign trade, the exchange of persons and ideas, and summit conferences—and tailored to the quest for the world-wide triumph of communism. Others, such as disarmament and Western recognition of the Russian empire through a sphere of influence agreement, were put forward by Stalin for reasons of power politics; they have gained added significance from Khrushchev's new over-all foreign policy.

Emphasis on Trade

Of the new specific foreign policies evolved by Khrushchev, none has a more direct bearing upon the over-all objective of the Soviet Union than foreign trade. The Russian leaders have time and again emphasized the importance which the Soviet Union attributes to increased trade with foreign countries, especially the United States. They have declared the willingness of capitalist nations to increase trade with the Soviet Union to be a test of good will and peaceful intentions. Following Cobden and Bright, the leaders of the Manchester Liberals of a century ago, as well as our own Secretary of State Cordell Hull, they have virtually identified international peace and foreign trade and waxed lyrical over what it will do for the private profits of the capitalists.

In truth, however, the Russian leaders want foreign trade not because they believe in the philosophy of nineteenth century liberalism, but because they need it to implement their domestic and foreign policies. For this reason, the Soviet Union has not been interested in the regular flow of foreign trade as it is normal between capitalist coun-

tries, but rather in spectacular single transactions. Thus the Soviet Union has shown an interest in buying whole plants, for instance petro-chemical ones, which would make it overnight independent of foreign imports in this particular field and a competitor in foreign trade tomorrow; or whole crops, for instance, cotton, a transaction which would make the exporting nation first economically and then politically dependent upon the Soviet Union. Foreign trade, then, is for the Soviet Union a political weapon. If foreign capitalists can be induced by appeals to the profit motive and the desire for peace to lend a helping hand in fashioning it, they are, of course, welcome.

Aside from strengthening its technological and industrial capabilities, the Soviet Union needs for the success of its new foreign policy a relaxation of political and military tensions or, as Khrushchev likes to put it, "an end to the cold war." It can be assumed that the Soviet professions of peaceful intentions are genuine, at least as long as the present distribution of military power persists. For the Soviet Union cannot be oblivious to the self-destructive effects of modern war and, hence, the utter irrationality of the use of all-out force under modern technological conditions. More specifically, the continuation and possible aggravation of political and military tensions must deflect the energies and resources of the Soviet Union from its over-all aim of making the world safe for communism.

Furthermore—and most importantly—the relaxation of tensions and the illusion that such relaxation is tantamount to the relaxation of the cold war is likely to disarm the non-Communist world in the face of that over-all aim of communism. Relieved of the tangible political and military pressures which threatened it and compelled it to be on its guard in the past, the non-Communist world might be only too eager to believe that with the disappearance of these pressures it has nothing to fear any more from the Soviet Union and that the cold war itself has come to an end. The non-Communist world, always prone to complacency in the absence of a tangible threat from abroad, such as Stalin used to supply periodically, would then become a passive target to be finished off by the

Soviet Union through economic competition, political subversion, and military conquest.

In other words, "the end to the cold war" in Khrushchev's terminology amounts really to the conduct of the cold war on Soviet terms. For as long as the non-Communist world remains able and willing to put up resistance to the professed Soviet aim to take over the world, the cold war must go on. It will come to an end only when one or the other side has given up the fight. It is in the light of the Soviet goal to disarm the West in the struggle for the world that one must see the other new policies that the Soviet Union is pursuing in its quest for the relaxation of tensions.

Relaxation of Restrictions

The Soviet Union has gone on record in favor of an exchange of persons and ideas with the non-Communist world. The systematic impediments to the free flow of persons and ideas which we call the Iron Curtain have been imposed by the Soviet Union primarily for domestic reasons. A terrorist regime patently inferior to the West in all the essentials of political, economic, and social life had to shun all contacts with the outside world which might have provoked invidious comparisons. With the passing of the Stalinist era and the rise of Russian self-confidence nourished by actual achievements, the Soviet Union can afford to open its gates to a modest degree to Western persons and ideas. As long as the Soviet Union maintains its totalitarian control of the mass media of communications, it will be able to neutralize the potential effects of such exchanges upon the minds of its citizens. It can also hope to impress the visitor with its achievements and in the process disarm him, while its own delegations might gain from their visits abroad information valuable in the competition for the mastery of the world.

The significance, within the over-all context of Soviet foreign policy, of the insistence on summit meetings in preference to negotiations through regular diplomatic channels is more difficult to assess. In part, it results no doubt from the relatively subordinate position, traditional in the Soviet system, of the foreign minister and his ambassadors. Thus it has become inevitable that not only the

decisions are made at the top, but that the negotiations implementing the decisions are carried on at the top as well. The tendency towards the personal diplomacy of heads of state and towards summit conferences is the result. In part, however, the Soviet promotion of that trend serves the purpose of disarming the non-Communist world before the Communist quest for world domination. The "spirit of Geneva," following the summit meeting of 1955, had a temporarily soporific effect on the West, and Khrushchev's visit to the United States has similarly evoked vistas of a harmonious, peaceful world. A succession of such visits and summit meetings, even if they should not lead to the settlement of any of the outstanding political issues, could create the illusion in many Western minds that the world was being set right and that the non-Communist world had nothing to fear from the Soviet Union.

The traditional insistence of Soviet foreign policy upon disarmament, preferably total, is a twin brother of its traditional insistence upon peace. It is really unnecessary to emphasize, as it is often done with great seriousness, that the Russians are "sincere" in their insistence upon both these aims. No doubt they are; for they must welcome, on general grounds and in view of the technological and economic goals they have set themselves, a reduction of the burdens which the armaments race imposes. Yet the Soviet government cannot be unaware of the fact, borne out both by logical analysis and historical experience, that a disarmament policy as a general proposition, divorced from a settlement of the political conflicts which have caused the armaments race in the first place, is an exercise in futility. But it can be useful as a weapon in the propaganda contest; it gives the champion of disarmament, especially in its total form, the opportunity of posing as the champion of peace.

All the aspects of Soviet foreign policy discussed thus far fall into a pattern: they all serve in different ways the over-riding aim of that policy which is the world-wide triumph of communism. How does the Soviet attempt to eliminate the Western presence in West Berlin, started by Khrushchev in November, 1958, without obvious necessity, fit into this pattern? The Western presence in

Berlin is the tangible symbol of the unresolved issue of where the western boundaries of the Soviet empire ought to be. The Soviet Union has since the end of World War II consistently claimed that Russia ought to be where it is today, following by and large the line of military demarcation fixed at the end of the Second World War.

The United States has as consistently claimed that that line was only provisional and that Soviet military and political control ought to be confined to the territory of the Soviet Union. The Western presence in Berlin challenges the permanence of the division of Germany upon which the Soviet claim to the permanence of the western frontiers of its empire is predicated. Thus the West, in order to be able to continue its challenge to the territorial status quo in Europe, must insist upon the maintenance of the status quo in Berlin. Conversely, the Soviet Union, in order to be able to stabilize the status quo in Europe, must challenge the political balance in Berlin.

The European Status Quo

In advancing this claim, Khrushchev follows in the footsteps of Stalin who time and again proposed to the United States a settlement of the cold war based upon the division of Europe into two spheres of influence with the dividing line running where the line of demarcation between East and West runs now. For both Stalin and Khrushchev, the

American recognition of the legitimacy of the Soviet empire has been a precondition of the relaxation of tensions and even the preservation of peace. Without that recognition, the territorial status quo in Europe is bound to be less secure than it would be otherwise. Both Stalin and Khrushchev have considered the security of that status quo as a precondition for the security of the Soviet Union itself.

For Khrushchev, however, that status quo has a significance transcending the security of the Soviet Union. For having revived the original world-wide aspirations of communism in view of the actual accomplishments of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev cannot afford to consider expendable any piece of territory where communism has been established. Were the Soviet Union to retreat from the advanced positions it holds in Central and Eastern Europe, it would thereby not only endanger its own security as it sees it, but also jeopardize its revived claim that communism will inherit the world as it has already inherited Eastern Europe. Here, then, lies the newly enhanced significance of the Berlin issue and the Soviet attempt to settle it on its own terms. As the Western presence in Berlin is a symbol of the impermanence of the division of Germany, so is the permanence of the western frontiers of its empire for the Soviet Union a symbol of the irreversible expansion of its political and social system, whose ultimate limits are the confines of the earth itself.

"... Students of the modern corporation make increasing references to a new feudalism. Parallels are drawn between the medieval manor with its systems of work and service obligations exchanged for protection, security, and privileges on the one part, and on the other, the modern corporation, particularly where technology is heavy, with its immobilized work force clustered around huge machines. Modern citizens look to the enterprise for ever-increasing standards of wages, security, and fringes in the same trusting confidence with which citizens of the feudal system once looked to the castle. . . . Since the institutions of feudalism served the times rather well, the analogy need not be deemed invidious.

"But if 20th century capitalism is being driven toward a status system in which social relationships are more potent than market forces, then we have much to ponder upon. The parallel between the medieval manor and the modern corporation is not complete. The manor was a self-contained estate which produced nothing for the market and needed no profit. The modern corporation must produce for the market—a competitive market—at a profit."

—Leland Hazard, *Professor of Industrial Administration, Carnegie Institute of Technology, in an address delivered April 27, 1959.*

Russian Criticism of American Foreign Policy

An Open Letter to the Editors of CURRENT HISTORY
from INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Moscow.

DEAR SIRs,—Your special Arab East issue has come to our notice. It prompts a number of questions, which we believe are of public interest and world import. Hence, this letter to you.

In a brief introductory note, you say that the articles in your special issue “discuss major problems of the Middle East.” You also rightly censure the Anglo-French-Israeli armed attack on Egypt as a “misguided and futile attempt to settle Middle Eastern tensions by force” (p. 257). We should say that it was not merely a “misguided and futile attempt,” but a criminal and frantic gamble which had nothing to do with “to settle tensions” and which nearly plunged mankind into another war.

While voicing mild criticism of the attack on Egypt, is it possible to ignore the question of what must be done to eliminate tension and preserve peace in the Middle East? But you ignore this question. Why? Do you not

include it among the “major problems” in the Arab East today?

You must know that the Soviet Union has not only repeatedly raised this question, but has also given a concrete answer. The Soviet Government has proposed that the United States, Britain, France and the U.S.S.R. renounce intervention in the internal affairs of the Arab countries, renounce the use of force in the area and end arms deliveries to these countries. You are, of course, free to criticize Soviet proposals, but in a special issue of your journal dealing with “major problems of the Middle East,” and containing, what is more, an article on Soviet policy in the Middle East, is it possible to ignore them completely? But this is in fact what you do.

Your introductory note ostensibly rejects the policy exemplified in the Anglo-French-Israeli attack against Egypt. But the articles in your special issue create a different impression, for they are infused with sentiments and intentions akin to those of the sponsors of the Suez gamble. Take your article on the American posture in the Arab countries. Its author is an anonymous official connected, an editorial note indicates, either with the State Department or the Pentagon. He describes the Arab East as “a key battleground of the cold war” (p. 273), as a “capstone of power,” over which “aspiring world conquerors in unbroken succession have sought control,” as a zone whose “strategic importance” is so great “that the battle for its future may well determine the outcome of the world struggle” (p. 272). The tenor of the article and its wording reveal intentions which bode no good for world peace.

“... United States objectives,” he writes, “seem to be: to assure the availability to the United States and its allies of resources, strategic positions and passage rights in the

This letter from the editors of *International Affairs*, a monthly journal published in Moscow, criticizes the November, 1957, issue of *Current History*, *The Middle East and the Balance of Power*. The letter appeared in the April, 1958, issue of *International Affairs*, and was later brought to our attention not by its editors, but by a *Current History* contributor, Professor Harold H. Fisher. It was difficult for us to find a copy of the letter and we very much regret our delay in presenting it to our readers. The editors reprint this letter in accord with the American tradition of the free press without in any way subscribing to these Soviet criticisms.

area (i.e., the Arab East—Ed.); to assist the development of stable viable friendly (towards the U.S.A.—Ed.) Governments in the area, capable of withstanding Communist-inspired subversion from within and willing to resist Communist aggression; and to promote wider recognition in the free world of the legitimate aspirations of the countries in the area and wider recognition by such countries of their responsibility toward the area and the free world generally" (p. 274).

The United States, therefore, lays claims to the "availability" of resources, strategic positions, passage rights—in short, the entire territory and resources of *other* countries. Moreover, the United States demands not only friendship but also active support for America's aggressive anti-Soviet policy. The United States demands that these countries play a direct part in the Washington-sponsored military blocs aimed against the Socialist countries and representing the "free world," which the peoples of the East rightly regard as the colonialist world.

It is true that, in return, the United States promises to "promote wider recognition in the free world of the legitimate aspirations" of the Arabs. But can the colonialist world be expected to recognize as legitimate the genuine aspirations of the Arabs? For what the Arabs want above all is to eliminate colonialism in their countries while the Western Powers, including the United States, as the author of the above-mentioned article admits, wish to preserve and consolidate that system, intending to act in that direction by force or the threat of force. The author of the article emphasizes that the Dulles-Eisenhower Doctrine is a doctrine providing for threats of this kind and that "this sort of employment of military force will probably be most important in the Middle East. The movement of the U.S. Sixth Fleet at the height of the Jordanian flare-up in the spring of 1957 may be a harbinger of similar future moves" (p. 275).

What can be more explicit? One need only add that if this use of military force as "a key psychological factor" (p. 275) fails, the United States will, the author broadly hints, not stop at armed intervention to back up American threats, particularly since the

aims of American Arab East policy go far beyond the limits of the area.

"The uncompromising fact," says the same article, "which must underline all United States political and military calculations is that technological progress makes it possible for the first time in man's history that a single Power may organize and control the entire world island of Asia, Europe, and Africa, if that Power first dominates the Middle East" (pp. 272-273).

The senior official (perhaps not just a mere official?) of the State Department or the Pentagon who wrote these words had good reason to remain anonymous. He has set out the real aims of United States foreign policy with a rare frankness. We must thank your journal for this straightforward and clear statement which involuntarily exposes Washington's lip service to peace and democracy.

The more so since the article in question gives an indirect explanation as to why your special issue failed to mention the Soviet proposals regarding the strengthening of peace in the Arab East. United States plans which are described with such cynical straightforwardness, one might say, naturally hold no promise of peace and their sponsors cannot hope for popularity among the Arabs. You yourself say that in these countries "the United States could hardly be said to be popular" (p. 271). And you naturally could hardly contribute to its popularity by advertising the patently colonialist designs of the United States in comparison with the Soviet proposals which represent a policy that is their direct opposite.

For similar reasons apparently Professor Harold Fisher finds it impossible, in his article on Soviet policy in the Arab East, to describe the purposes and methods of Soviet diplomacy such as they really are and chooses to depict them after the image and likeness of American purposes and methods.

He asserts that Soviet aims in the Arab East are twofold: on the one hand, they are a legacy of the predatory policy of the tsars and can be traced back to the times of Ivan the Terrible; on the other, they constitute the "world revolutionary mission of the Communist movement" aimed at a forcible change of "the political and economic systems of other non-Communist countries in accord-

¹ All editorial comments contained in parentheses are those of the editors of *International Affairs*.

ance with the pattern developed in the U.S.S.R." (p. 278).

But what proof is there of this?

"The first tactical objective" of Soviet "basic strategy," declares the Professor, was to "establish in the minds of the Arabs the idea that the Soviet state 'had repudiated the imperialist policies of tsarist Russia. This was done by nullifying the old treaties by which Russia enjoyed special rights and privileges and then negotiating new treaties of friendship on a basis of equality, for example, the treaties with Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan in February and March 1921'" (p. 280).

That is precisely what the Soviet Government did. It repudiated the imperialist heritage of tsarist Russia and continued to support the anti-imperialist aspirations of the oppressed peoples. But what has all this to do with "tactics," "strategy," and "attempts" to influence the minds of the peoples in question? Soviet policy is a natural consequence of the Socialist nature of the Soviet state. This is not "tactics" and "manoeuvres," as Mr. Fisher wishes his readers to believe, but a Socialist foreign policy consistently pursued for four decades that has "created a lasting impression in the Middle East, Far East and South Asia and has won the Communists a reputation as the champions of nationalism (that is, the national-liberation movement—Ed.) and reform" (p. 280).

By contrast, the Western Powers, and the United States in particular, have failed, as you yourself say, to arouse any emotion among the peoples of the East except distrust or even indignation, for although these Powers have manoeuvred, vowed their "anti-colonialism" and been lavish with dollars for "aid," they, as Fisher must admit, have been and remain colonialists. It is the United States, not the U.S.S.R.; that is trying to continue the long-bankrupt policy of tsarist Russia and the equally bankrupt policy of the other old colonial Powers in the Arab East.

Nor do the author's assertions that the Soviet "mission" is to forcibly change the social and political system in the "non-Communist countries" hold water. He ascribes the objective processes of social development to evil Soviet designs—an old and timeworn trick to which the enemies of social progress

have invariably resorted. It is not for us to teach Mr. Fisher political grammar but we doubt whether he really believes it possible to stir up an artificial Communist movement in any country. He is doubtless conversant with historical facts which prove that every change in the social system of a country is and can only be the product of its internal development and that no amount of external interference can have any lasting or stable effect on that process. Yet he assures his readers of what he himself scarcely believes, and presents his invention[s] as axiomatic and requiring no proof. In fact, they defy proof.

But we must admit that there is method in his inventions. The author of the article in *Current History* judges Soviet policy by American standards. The United States is in fact trying to forcibly stem the tide of national liberation in the East, to preserve the colonial order in the Arab countries and restore their puppets in the Chinese People's Republic. Therefore it promotes organizations like the Baghdad Pact or the armed Kuomintang group on Taiwan. Why not pretend that the Soviet Union does the same?

But the principles of Soviet foreign policy—the policy of a Socialist state—differ radically from those of the foreign policy of any capitalist state. Moreover, they are based on the real balance of forces in the world and take into account the real perspectives of their development. By contrast, the Western Powers, the United States in particular, do not look to the future but cling to the past. They do not base their foreign policy on the real balance of forces but rather on what they wrongly believe this balance and their perspectives to be. Hence the Baghdad Pact, the Kuomintang regime and similar artificial barriers—barriers which are doomed to collapse, but to which Washington nevertheless clings in its hopes of holding up the march of history.

The Soviet Union has never and will never entertain the idea of resorting to such artificial measures for the simple reason that the aims of its foreign policy coincide with the real trends of historical development, in particular with the aspirations for national freedom among the peoples of the East. That is why the basic task of our policy in the Arab East, particularly since the Arabs are our

close neighbours, is to preserve peace, which is threatened by colonialist machinations and the rivalry among the leading Western capitalist Powers.

The Soviet Union, contrary to Fisher's assertions, does not aspire to dominate the Arab East. The danger to American and other Western positions in the Arab countries lies elsewhere. And, the scales suddenly falling from his eyes, Fisher actually admits this in the closing lines of his article. Everything will depend, he says, on "whether the Western Powers have the wisdom to accept the fact that these ancient lands of the Middle East are in the throes of a revolution of vast significance" (p. 282).

Precisely! But this important admission should prompt certain conclusions. If the

author fails to draw them, we believe it is the duty of the Editors to do so.

Of course, we do not expect your journal to support the Soviet point of view. But we should like to see you approach Soviet foreign policy as you have done your own, instead of substituting it by absurd inventions. The closing lines of Professor Fisher's article are in themselves proof that everything he has written about the purposes and methods of Soviet diplomacy in the Arab East is absurd. Elementary logic makes this an undeniable fact, and we hope that you will not insist on hushing it up and will publish our letter in your journal.

The Editors
International Affairs

"... Some people may have thought, perhaps, that I would come to the United States to lobby for the development of Soviet-American trade without which, in their opinion, the seven-year plan cannot be accomplished. I want to say in all frankness that I have not come here to beg. We have always advocated the development of international trade, since the inception of the Soviet state, in fact, and if we raise this question today, it is certainly not because the seven year plan cannot be fulfilled without such trade. Those who think so are deeply mistaken.

"We attach considerable importance to the development of international trade. . . .

"... I want to stress that the Soviet Government always has been and always will be for international trade on the basis of equality and mutual advantage, without any discrimination—the trade spoken of by Benjamin Franklin, whose words, 'Commerce among nations should be fair and equitable,' can, I believe be seen engraved above the main entrance to the United States Department of Commerce."

—Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev in an address before the Economic Club dinner, New York, September 17, 1959.

STATEMENT OF THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, AND CIRCULATION REQUIRED BY THE ACT OF CONGRESS OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AS AMENDED BY THE ACTS OF MARCH 3, 1933, AND JULY 2, 1946 (Title 39, United States Code, Section 233) of CURRENT HISTORY, published monthly at Philadelphia, Pa., for October, 1959.

1. The names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are: Publisher, Daniel G. Redmond, Jr., 324 Kent Road, Bala Cynwyd, Pa.; Editor, Carol L. Thompson, Wolfpit Rd., Norwalk, Conn.; Managing Editor, None; Business Manager, None. 2. The owner is: (If owned by a corporation, its name and address must be stated and also immediately thereunder the names and addresses of stockholders owning or holding 1 per cent or more of total amount of stock. If not owned by a corporation, the names and addresses of the individual owners must be given. If owned by a partnership or other unincorporated firm, its name and address, as well as that of each individual member, must be given.) Current History, Inc., 1822 Ludlow St., Phila. 3, Pa.; Shelby Cul-lom Davis, Scarborough-on-Hudson, N. Y.; Orin McMillan, 1341 Morrison St., Madison, Wis.; D. G. Redmond, Jr., 324 Kent Road, Bala Cynwyd, Pa.; Claire P. Redmond, 30 Westview St., Phila. 19, Pa. The known bondholders, mortgagees, and other security holders owning or holding 1 per cent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages, or other securities are: (If there are none, so state.) None. 4. Paragraphs 2 and 3 include, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting; also the statements in the two paragraphs show the affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 23rd day of September, 1959.
(Seal)

D. G. REDMOND, JR., Publisher

GEORGE W. DEAL, Notary Public, Phila., Phila. Co.,
(My commission expires January 7, 1963.)

Current Documents

Eisenhower-Khrushchev Joint Communiqué

On September 27, 1959, at the termination of three days of talks between Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev and U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower at Camp David, Maryland, the two leaders issued a joint communiqué outlining the topics discussed and the general areas of agreement. Following is the complete text of the Soviet-United States communiqué:

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., N. S. Khrushchev, and President Eisenhower have had a frank exchange of opinions at Camp David.

In some of these conversations the United States Secretary of State Herter and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, as well as other officials from both countries, participated.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the President have agreed that these discussions have been useful in clarifying each other's position on a number of subjects. The talks were not undertaken to negotiate issues.

It is hoped, however, that their exchanges of views will contribute to a better understanding of the motives and position of each, and thus to the achievement of a just and lasting peace.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the President of the United States agreed that the question of general disarmament is the most important one facing the world today. Both governments will make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem.

In the course of the conversations an exchange of views took place on the question of Germany, including the question of a peace treaty with Germany, in which the

positions of both sides were expounded.

With respect to the specific Berlin question, an understanding was reached, subject to the approval of the other parties directly concerned, that negotiations would be reopened with a view to achieving a solution which would be in accordance with the interests of all concerned and in the interest of the maintenance of peace.

In addition to these matters, useful conversations were held on a number of questions affecting the relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States. These subjects included the question of trade between the two countries. With respect to an increase in exchanges of persons and ideas, substantial progress was made in discussions between officials and it is expected that certain agreements will be reached in the near future.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the President of the United States agreed that all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the application of force but by peaceful means through negotiation.

Finally, it was agreed that an exact date for the return visit of the President to the Soviet Union next spring would be arranged through diplomatic channels.

SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

On September 18, 1959, Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev of the U.S.S.R., on a visit to the United States, addressed the United Nations General Assembly, setting out his proposals for a "general and complete disarmament" program. We reprint here the significant excerpts from the text of the Soviet Premier's speech and his "Program of General and Complete Disarmament."

Premier Khrushchev's Address to the United Nations

All peoples need peace. At the conclusion of the Second World War, the Soviet

Union submitted concrete disarmament proposals in the United Nations. We proposed complete prohibition of atomic weapons, a substantial reduction of the armed forces and armaments and a sharp cut in arms expenditures. We went on record for the liquidation of military bases on foreign territories and for the withdrawal of armed forces from foreign territories.

We have proved our desire to solve the disarmament problem by deeds, not by words. The Soviet Union has time and again taken the lead in proposing specific steps toward putting an end to the arms race and getting down as soon as possible to practical measures toward disarmament.

Immediately after the end of the war, we carried out an extensive demobilization of the armed forces of our country. The Soviet Union has closed down all the military bases which it had on the territories of other states at the end of the Second World War.

* * *

For more than fourteen years now in the United Nations and in other international conferences has the problem of disarmament been under discussion but no practical results have been achieved as yet:

Now what is the reason for this . . . ?

I wouldn't like to rake over the past or consider at length the obstacles and differences that arose in the course of disarmament talks, much less level accusations against anyone. This is not the main thing today.

The main thing in our profound conviction is to remove the main roadblocks that have been raised in the way of disarmament to endeavor to find a new approach to the solution of this problem.

The experience of disarmament negotiations has shown that one of the main obstacles to agreement has been the question of control which was raised. Now we were and are in favor of strict international control over the implementation of the disarmament agreement when it is reached, but we have always been against the system of control being separated from measures for disarmament, against the organs of control becoming in effect organs for the collection of intelligence information and conditions where there would in effect be no actual disarmament.

We are in favor of genuine disarmament

under control but we are against control without disarmament.

It would be easy for the opponents of disarmament to make any measure conditional upon such demands for control that the other states would be unable to satisfy them in the conditions of the universal arms race.

Indeed, those same countries which for one reason or another advance such far-reaching demands for the control would not be inclined to accept these demands themselves if it came through their implementation.

There exist other difficulties also. So long as disarmament is conceived only as partial disarmament, and it is assumed that some armaments will remain after the conclusion of a disarmament agreement, the states would still retain the material possibility of launching an attack.

Apprehensions would always exist that with the aid of the remaining types of armaments and armed forces the possibility of launching an attack would continue extant.

The understanding that such a possibility remains constitutes in no small measure an obstacle in the disarmament negotiations.

Many states said that disarmament measures would affect precisely those types of armament in which they had the greatest advantage or superiority, and which they believed to be particularly necessary or essential for themselves.

Naturally, under these circumstances, given the atmosphere of the "cold war" and mutual suspicion, no state speaking seriously and not for propaganda could reveal its military secrets, the organization of defense and war production without impairing the interests of its national security.

* * *

The Soviet government having comprehensively examined the situation which obtains has come to the firm conviction that the way out of the deadlock should be sought along the road of general and complete disarmament. With such an approach the possibility of creating any military advantages for these states or those states would be completely ruled out.

It is general and complete disarmament that will remove all the barriers that were raised during the consideration of questions of partial disarmament.

It is this general and complete disarmament that will clear the way for the establishment of comprehensive and complete control.

What does the Soviet government propose?

The essence of all proposals is that over a period of four years all states should effect complete disarmament and should no longer have any means of waging war. This means that land armies, navies and air forces shall cease to exist; that general staffs and war ministries shall be abolished; that military educational establishments shall be closed. Dozens of millions of men shall return to peaceful creative labor.

Military bases in foreign territories shall be abolished. All atomic and hydrogen bombs at the disposal of states shall be destroyed and their further production terminated. The energy of fissionable materials shall be used exclusively for peaceful, economic and scientific purposes.

Military rockets of all ranges shall be liquidated and rocket facilities shall remain only as a means of transportation, and for the harnessing of outer space for the benefit of all mankind.

At the disposal of states there should remain only strictly limited contingents of police, of militia, agreed upon for each country, armed with small arms and intended exclusively to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of the citizens.

To insure that no one would violate their obligations, we propose the setting up of an international control body comprising all states, with the participation of all states. There should be initiated a system of control over all disarmament measures which should be created and should function in conformity with the stages by which disarmament should be effected.

If disarmament is comprehensive and complete, then upon its attainment control shall likewise be general and complete. The states will have nothing to conceal from one another any more. None of them will dispose of a weapon that could be used against the

other, and therefore the controllers will be able to manifest their zeal to the hilt.

Such a solution of disarmament questions would insure the complete security of all states. It will generate favorable conditions for the peaceful coexistence of states. All international problems will then be resolved not by force of arms but by peaceful means.

* * *

The Soviet government believes that the elaboration of a program of general and complete disarmament should not hold up the solution of such an acute and fully mature question as that of the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests for all time.

All the prerequisites for such a solution are now at hand. We hope that the appropriate agreement on the discontinuance of tests will be concluded and put into effect without delay.

* * *

It goes without saying that if at present owing to a variety of reasons the Western powers do not manifest their readiness to embark on general and complete disarmament, then the Soviet government is ready to come to agreement with other states on the appropriate partial steps of disarmament and the strengthening of security.

The principal ones of these steps in the opinion of the Soviet government are the following:

First, the creation of a zone of control and inspection with a reduction of foreign troops on the territories of the corresponding countries of Western Europe.

Second, the creation of an atom-free zone in Central Europe.

Third, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of European states and the liquidation of military bases from foreign territories.

Fourth, the conclusion of a nonaggression pact between the member states of Nato and the states party to the Warsaw Treaty.

Fifth, an agreement on the question of the prevention of surprise attack by one state upon another.

* * *

Program of General and Complete Disarmament

The program of general and complete disarmament should include the following measures:

Disbandment of all armed forces (land, naval and air) and the prohibition of their re-establishment in any form;

Destruction of all types of arms and ammunition both in the armed forces and in storage;

Liquidation of all naval vessels; military aircraft and all other types of war matériel;

Complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons—discontinuance of the production of all types of these weapons, their removal from the armaments of states and the liquidation of their stockpiles;

Complete termination of the production and the destruction of all types of rocket weapons of any range, including space rockets for military purposes;

Prohibition of the production, possession and storing of the means of chemical and bacteriological warfare and the destruction of the stockpiles of these types of weapons;

Liquidation of military bases of any kind in foreign territories—land, naval and air, and all rocket launching installations;

Liquidation of military production at war plants and war production facilities in general industries;

Discontinuance of all kinds of refresher courses and military training both within the army and in public organizations, and the enactment of laws abolishing military service in any form—compulsory, voluntary, through recruiting, et cetera;

Abolition of war ministries, general staffs, military educational institutions and all kinds of military and paramilitary establishments and organizations;

Discontinuance of appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form both through the state budget and by public organizations and private persons.

Prohibition by law of war propaganda and military education of the youth, and the enactment of laws providing for the strictest punishment for violation of any of the above measures.

At the disposal of states there should only remain strictly limited contingents of police (militia) agreed for each country, equipped with small arms and designed solely to maintain internal order and to protect the personal security of citizens.

To supervise the timely implementation of measures on general and complete disarmament, there shall be established an international control body comprised of all states.

The staff of the control body shall be recruited on an international basis with due regard to the principle of equitable geographical distribution.

The international control body shall have at its disposal all facilities necessary to exercise strict control. The functions and powers of that body shall correspond to the nature of the disarmament measures that are being carried out.

The Soviet government proposes that the program of general and complete disarmament be carried out as soon as possible—within the period of four years.

For the first stage the following measures are proposed:

To reduce under appropriate controls the strength of the armed forces of the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A. and P.R.C. to the level of 1,700,000 and those of the United Kingdom and France to 650,000 for each.

To reduce the strength of the armed forces of other states to levels to be agreed at a special session of the United Nations General Assembly or at a World Conference on General and Complete Disarmament.

To reduce armaments and matériel at the disposal of the armed forces of states to such an extent that the remaining quantity of armaments would correspond to the determined level of armed forces.

For the second stage the following is proposed:

Completion of the liquidation of armed forces retained by the states.

Liquidation of all military bases on foreign territories. Troops and military personnel are to be withdrawn from foreign territories to within their own national frontiers and are to be disbanded.

For the third stage it is proposed:

Destruction of all types of nuclear and rocket weapons.

Liquidation of the matériel of the air force.

Prohibition of the production, possession and storing of the means of chemical and bacteriological warfare shall come into force. All stocks of chemical and bacteriological weapons in the possession of states shall be removed and destroyed under international control.

Scientific research for war purposes and the development of weapons and war matériel shall be prohibited.

War ministries, general staffs, all military and para-military establishments and organizations shall be abolished.

All kinds of refresher courses and military training is to be terminated. States must prohibit by law military education of the youth. In accordance with their respective constitutional procedures, states shall enact laws abolishing military service in any form—compulsory, voluntary, through recruiting, etcetera, and prohibiting the re-establishment in overt or covert form of any military or paramilitary establishments and organizations.

Appropriation of funds for military purposes in any form through state budgets and by public organizations is to be discontinued. The funds released as a result of the implementation of general and complete disarmament should be used to reduce or to completely abolish taxes on the population, to finance national economies and to render extensive economic and technical assistance to under-developed countries.

To control the implementation of measures on general and complete disarmament there shall be established an international control body. The scope of control and inspection shall correspond to the extent of the phased disarmament of states.

Upon the attainment of general and complete disarmament which must include the liquidation of all services of the armed forces,

the destruction of all types of weapons including weapons of mass annihilation (nuclear, rocket, chemical, bacteriological), the international control body shall have free access to all objects under control.

The control organization may set up a system of aerial observation and air photography over the territories of states.

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In the process of the implementation of the program of general and complete disarmament down to the disbandment of all armed forces, the states shall maintain such a ratio among the various services of their armed forces as existed at the time the treaty on disarmament entered into force.

The program of general and complete disarmament is to be carried out by states in strict conformity with the time limits specified in the treaty, and its implementation cannot be suspended or made dependent on the fulfilment of any conditions not provided for by the treaty.

To prevent any state from making an attempt to circumvent or to violate the treaty on general and complete disarmament, the treaty should include provisions stipulating that the question of its violation is subject to immediate consideration by the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations in accordance with their powers.

* * *

FRANCE'S PROPOSALS FOR AN ALGERIAN SETTLEMENT

After almost four years of strife between Algerian nationalist rebels and French Army troops, French President Charles de Gaulle, on September 18, 1959, offered a radical solution: no later than "four years after the actual restoration of peace," an election will be held whereby Algerians may decide whether (1) to secede from the French Community, (2) to retain close ties and permit complete integration with Metropolitan France, or (3) to establish an independent Algerian government with federal ties to France. The full text of the de Gaulle proposals is reprinted below:

Our recovery is proceeding. Obviously, we should not boast. In the technical field, for instance, we have not yet reached the stage of sending rockets to the moon. For the last fifteen months, however, our affairs have been improving.

The unity of our nation has been welded anew. In finance, trade and currency, equi-

librium is soundly established. By virtue of that very fact, the situation of all Frenchmen, and first and foremost that of workers in agriculture and industry, has by-passed the tragedy of both inflation and recession.

On the structure thus established, and as the process of expansion develops, it will be possible to foster social advancement and

organize cooperation between the various categories which together make up our economy, to pursue the essential task of training our young people, to develop the tools at our disposal for scientific and technical research.

On the other hand, the Community has been founded between France, eleven African states and the Republic of Madagascar. Finally, in the midst of a world where the maintenance of peace and the survival of freedom are together at stake, our voice is being heard.

For France, however, the difficult, blood-soaked problem of Algeria remains to be settled; we must settle it.

This we will not achieve by tossing at each other vacuous over-simplifications, thought out by one and any of those who are blind to everything save their conflicting passions, interests or daydreams. We will achieve it as a great nation should do, choosing the only path worthy of being followed. I mean the free choice which the Algerians themselves will make for their future.

If the truth be told, much has been done already to pave the way for this solution.

Through pacification, first of all. Nothing can be solved against a background of shooting and assassination. From that point of view, I cannot claim that we have reached the end of the road. But I am saying that there is no comparison, in terms of the safety of goods and persons, between the situation which prevailed two or three years ago and that which prevails now.

Our Army is accomplishing its mission both adroitly and courageously, fighting its opponents while maintaining with the population contacts more full and on a broader scale than had ever been achieved hitherto. If our soldiers, and above all the 120,000 Muslims among them, had faltered in their duty or if the Algerian masses had turned against France, that indeed would have spelt disaster. But since this has not occurred, the restoration of public order, although it may not be imminent, is well at hand.

The second requisite for a settlement is that all Algerians should have the means of expressing themselves through universal suffrage. Up to last year they have never had it. They have it now, thanks to the institution of equal rights, a single body of electors and the fact that the more numerous com-

munities, the Muslim ones, are sure of obtaining at the polls the largest numbers of representatives elected.

This was a change of the greatest importance, indeed, a revolution. Last September 28, the Algerians, by referendum, adopted the Constitution and notified [us of] their intention that their future should be shaped along with France.

On November 30, they elected their Deputies, on April 19, their municipal authorities, and, on May 31, their Senators.

No doubt there are some people who claim that, in the situation where the electors found themselves, pressed by the pacification forces while threatened by the insurgents, this electoral consultation was only to a limited extent sincere. It has taken place, however, in towns and rural areas and with a large mass of electors. And even at the time of the referendum, participation was widespread, spontaneous and enthusiastic.

At all events the path is open. As soon as violence has subsided, it may be used even more broadly, and more freely. Next year, the election of the general councils will take place, from which will be drawn, at a later stage, a number of administrative, economic and social councils, which will be called upon to deliberate, with the Delegate General, on the development of Algeria.

To solve the problem of Algeria is not merely to restore order or to grant people the right of self-determination. It is also, indeed it is primarily, to deal with a human problem.

There we have populations whose numbers double every 35 years on a land that is to a great extent untitled and devoid of mines, factories or important sources of power, submerged in poverty which seems to belong to their very nature.

What is at stake is to give the Algerians enough to support themselves with their own work, to see to it that an elite should emerge and be trained, that their soil and subsoil should yield more and better products. This involves a vast effort in the sense of social and economic development, an effort, indeed, which is already in course.

For the year 1959 France will have spent in Algeria—to mention only public investments and civilian running expenses—some 200 billion francs. Expenses will rise higher during the course of the coming years, as

the Constantine Plan will be coming into force. Over the past ten months, ten industrial plants have applied for permission to settle. Twenty thousand acres of fertile soil are being allocated to Muslim land workers. The number of Algerians working in metropolitan France has increased by 50,000.

The number of Muslims in public employment has increased by 5,000. At the beginning of the coming school year, schools in Algeria will be receiving some 860,000 children as against 700,000 at the corresponding time last year and 560,000 the year before.

In six weeks the oil at Hassi Messaoud will be arriving on the coastline at Bougie. In another year, the oil from Edjele will be reaching the Gulf of Gabès. In 1960, the gas from Hassi R'mel will begin to be distributed in Algiers and Oran, later at Bône.

If France be willing, and if she be in a position to pursue with the Algerians the task she has undertaken and which she is alone able to bring to fruition, then Algeria will be in 15 years a prosperous and productive land.

Thanks to the progress of pacification, of democracy, and to social evolution, we can now look forward to the day when the men and women who live in Algeria will be in a position to decide on their destiny, once and for all, freely in the full knowledge of what is at stake. Taking into account all these factors, those of the Algerian situation, those inherent in the national and the international situation, I deem it necessary that recourse to self-determination be here and now proclaimed.

In the name of France and of the Republic, by virtue of the power granted to me by our Constitution to consult its citizens, granted that God let me live and that the people lend me their ear, I commit myself to ask, on the one hand, of the Algerians in their 12 departments, what it is they finally wish to be and, on the other hand, of all Frenchmen to endorse their choice.

The question, obviously, will be put to the Algerians as individuals. For since the beginning of the world there has never been any true Algerian unity. Far less any Algerian sovereignty.

The Carthaginians, the Romans, the Vandals, the Byzantines, the Syrian Arabs, the Cordoba Arabs, the Turks, the French, have one after the other penetrated the country

without there being at any time, under any shape or form, an Algerian state.

As for the time of the election, I will decide upon it in due course, at the latest four years after the actual restoration of peace, that is to say, once a situation has been established whereby loss of life, be it in ambushes or isolated attempts, will not exceed 200 a year.

The following span of time will be devoted to resuming normal existence, to emptying the prisons and the camps, to allowing for exiles to return, to restoring the free play of individual and public freedom and to enabling the population to be fully aware of what is at stake.

I would like to invite, here and now, observers from all over the world, to attend, without let or hindrance, the final culmination of this process.

But what will this political destiny finally be, for the men and women of Algeria who will be choosing it once peace is restored? Everyone knows that in theory it is possible to imagine three solutions. Since it is in the interest of all concerned, and first of all of France, that the question should be answered with no room for ambiguity, the three arrangements which it is possible to conceive of will be the object of the consultation.

Either secession, where some believe independence would reside: France would then leave the Algerians, who would have expressed their wish to become separated from her. They would organize, without her, the territory in which they live, the resources which they have at their call, the government which they desire.

I am convinced personally that such an outcome would be incredible and disastrous. Algeria being what it is at the present time, and the world what we know it to be, secession would carry in its wake the most appalling poverty, an abysmal political chaos, all-out slaughter, and soon the warlike dictatorship of the Communists. But this ghost must be laid, and by the Algerians themselves.

If it were to appear, through inconceivable misfortune, that such is indeed their true wish, France would undoubtedly cease to devote so many values, and so many billions of francs, to a cause shorn of any hope.

It goes without saying that, on this assumption, those Algerians of any origin who would wish to remain French would do so in any

event and that France would arrange, if the case arose, for their regrouping and resettlement. On the other hand, everything would be arranged so that the operation of oil wells, the handling and shipping of Saharan oil, which is the result of French efforts and of interest to the Western world as a whole, be provided for in any event.

Or else, out-and-out identification with France, such as is implied in the equality of rights: Algerians can accede to all political, administrative and legal responsibilities under the jurisdiction of the state and have free access to public service.

They would benefit, from the point of view of salaries, social security, education, professional training, by all measures provided for in Metropolitan France, they would reside and work wherever they would see fit, on the length and breadth of the territory of the Republic: in other words they would be living, from every point of view, and whatever their religion or the community to which they belong, by and large on the same footing and at the same level as other citizens and become part and parcel of the French people who would then, truly, spread from Dunkirk to Tamanrasset.

Or else, the Government of Algeria by Algerians: backed up by French help and in narrow relationship with her, for economy, teaching, defense and foreign relations. In that case, the internal regime of Algeria should be of the federal type, so that the various communities, French, Arab, Kabylia, Mozabite, who live together in the country should be given guarantees for their own life and a framework for cooperation.

Since for the past year, however, through the institution of equal voting rights, the single college and the emergence of a majority of Muslim representatives, the political future of Algeria is to be settled by Algerians, since it has been officially and solemnly emphasized that, once peace will have been restored, the Algerians will let it be known what fate they want for themselves, at the exclusion of any other, and that all of them, whatever their program may be, whatever they might have done, wherever they come from, will take part, if they wish to do so, in

this consultation, what then may be the meaning of rebellion?

If those who lead it claim for all Algerians the right to self-determination, well then, all paths are wide open. If the insurgents fear that by agreeing to a cease-fire they will be yielding themselves up to justice, then it is entirely up to them to settle with the authorities the conditions for their unhindered return, as I have suggested when I offered the peace of the brave.

If the men who represent the political organization behind the rising intend not to be excluded from the debate, or later from the polls, or the institutions which will settle the future of Algeria and shape its political life, I proclaim that they will have, as all others, and no more and no less, the hearing, the role, the place which the votes of their fellow citizens will determine for them. Why then should the odious strife and the fratricidal murders which are still drenching the Algerian soil with blood continue?

Unless it be the work of a group of ambitious agitators, determined to establish by brute force and terror their totalitarian dictatorship and believing that they will one day obtain from the Republic the privilege of debating with them the future of Algeria, building them up into an Algerian government. There is not a chance that France should lend herself, in this way, to the arbitrary. The future of Algeria rests with the Algerians, not as thrust upon them by machine-gun and knife, but according to the wishes which they will freely express through universal suffrage. For them and with them, France will see to it that their choice is free.

During the course of the few years which will run out before the dateline we have set, there will be much to do so that Algeria when pacified may measure what are exactly the ins and outs of its own decision. I intend to address myself personally to the task.

On the other hand, the ways and means of the future consultation may be in due course elaborated and specified. But the road is open. The decision is taken. The game is worthy of France.

"Sunflower seed is the most important oil-bearing crop in the U.S.S.R."

From a Twentieth Century Fund Study.

Received At Our Desk

DREAM AND REALITY: Aspect of American Foreign Policy. By LOUIS J. HALLE. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. 327 pages, \$5.00.)

Louis J. Halle, a former member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, has written a sophisticated series of essays which illumine the dilemmas facing our national leaders.

American foreign policy has, from the beginning, been torn "between involvement and isolation, between alignment and neutrality." Mr. Halle traces the roots of isolationism in the United States and the factors leading to contemporary internationalism. In the process, he demolishes many enduring myths, recounts the history of our acquisition of the Philippines and consequent involvement in Asian affairs, and proceeds to analyze the failures of Wilsonian diplomacy.

The essays bring us to the threshold of the present, but do not attempt to offer suggestions for future action. They do, however, provide urbane insights into the past. Mr. Halle acknowledges that "the whole superstructure of foreign policy depends on the substructure of legend, which is generally composed of . . . fallacies" stemming from the tendency to attribute to one's own nation "a congenital predominance of virtue" and to one's antagonist a comparable monopoly of immorality. A realistic policy must appreciate the predicaments of the enemy. But, what then? Perhaps Mr. Halle will focus his talents on present-day problems in a future book.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein
University of Pennsylvania

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MIDDLE EAST. By WALTER Z. LAQUEUR (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. 366 pages, appendix and index, \$6.00.)

Mr. Laqueur, a noted expert on Middle Eastern affairs (one of the few, incidentally,

who warned of the precariousness of Iraq's commitment to the Baghdad Pact and of the instability of King Faisal's pro-Western regime months before the Kassim-led revolt of July, 1958), has written a penetrating analysis of Soviet attitudes and policies toward the Middle East since 1917. Aply, cogently, and interestingly, he traces the innumerable policy shifts which have characterized Soviet policy toward the area.

The first half of the book deals with "The Soviet Image of the Middle East," a perceptive series of essays on Soviet theory toward the national revolutions sweeping the underdeveloped world, and particularly the Middle East. Since 1953, Soviet policy has returned to the Leninist view that revolutions in the underdeveloped world need not follow the Soviet pattern. Cooperation with bourgeois-nationalist parties is an acceptable tactic, provided the Communist party maintains its independent identity and can maneuver to a position of eventual control.

The second half, "The Great Breakthrough," is devoted to a detailed analysis of Soviet policies in the Middle East between 1954 and 1958. With care and sophistication, Mr. Laqueur marshals his evidence and presents it with devastating force. He holds that Soviet successes in the area cannot be ascribed to any single cause. "It is even doubtful whether they should, or even could, be interpreted solely in terms of foreign policies. One great secret of the Soviet achievement here was merely that Russia was not involved, and could refrain from action whenever, or wherever, the West could hardly avoid it. In the Arab world, Russia was not tarred with the brush of imperialism: for forty years it had been absent from the area, whereas the Western powers had been very much in evidence there. . . . While Western interests clashed everywhere with the rising tide of Arab nationalism, Russia was thus able to appear in the guise of a disinterested and benevolent onlooker."

His analyses of the basis of the Communist appeal, and of the weaknesses and potenti-

alities of Arab nationalism, are excellent. He concludes that "the present leadership of the Arab national movement will try to carry out its own program of uniting the Arab world, of restoring it to its old power and glory. Arab nationalists believe that they are on the threshold of success. But they are not the only, possibly not the strongest, contestants in the struggle for the Middle East. The end of the first act in this drama is in sight. So is the beginning of the second." No one interested in Soviet and Middle Eastern affairs can ignore this outstanding pioneer work. A.Z.R.

PROTRACTED CONFLICT. BY ROBERT STRAUSS-HUPÉ, WILLIAM R. KINTNER, JAMES E. DOUGHERTY AND ALVIN J. COTTRELL. (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. 203 pages, appendix, notes, \$3.95.)

Four associates of the Foreign Policy Institute at the University of Pennsylvania have written a provocative, thoughtful study which seeks "to analyze the intermediate range of challenges posed to the Western alliance by the Communists, particularly those operations which enabled the Communists to carry on 'nibbling expansion' at the expense of the Free World without ever provoking the United States to unleash the full force of its nuclear power." There are two phases to this study. The first phase probes "into the manner by which the Communists managed to circumvent the West's primary defenses while conducting their campaign of global power accumulation." The second phase relates "the strategy of protracted conflict to the systematic revolution which is in progress throughout the newly emergent nations of the world, particularly in Asia and Africa."

The authors regard Protracted Conflict as a historical phenomenon which "attends upon every systemic breakdown and the ensuing quest for a new equilibrium," and view it as a strategy "for annihilating the opponent over a period of time by limited operations, by feints and maneuvers, psychological manipulations and diverse forms of violence." Their essays attempt to give fresh expression to the character of the contemporary Communist challenge. In the process, they have forcefully presented a thesis likely to stir considerable argument.

Though few will dispute the magnitude of the threat facing the West today, many may question the almost political and strategic omniscience attributed by the authors to Soviet leaders. In a desire to strengthen an already strong thesis, the authors have indulged in certain oversimplifications. A number of their interpretations may also be disputed. For example, the second Comintern Congress of July, 1920, was far more important in setting forth Communist strategy for subverting the underdeveloped world than was the Baku Conference of September, 1920.

But these are perhaps minor points. The book incisively develops the magnitude of the Communist challenge, and the uncompromising hostility of communism as a creed and as a political movement. Though pessimistic in tone, it concludes with a degree of guarded optimism.

A.Z.R.

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WARSAW IN CHAINS. BY STEFAN KORBONSKI. Translated by Norbert Guterman. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1959. 319 pages and index, \$6.00.)

This sensitive statement of the "liberation" of Poland by the Red Army is a depressing record of the imposition of Communist tyranny. Korbonski, a high-ranking member of the Polish Peasant party and an active member of the underground resistance to Hitler, picks up the threads of his earlier story of *Fighting Warsaw* (an evaluation of the Polish resistance movement during World War II), and continues it through his escape (and that of other leading Peasant party officials) to the West in late 1947.

In a day by day commentary, the author describes the web the Communists spun over Poland in the name of "people's democracy." Because of his position in the Polish Diet as a deputy and in the higher echelons of the Polish Peasant party, Korbonski's observations of the new regime are both first hand and first rate. The book goes beyond political struggles and police state brutalities; a sense of the Polish spirit and Polish character is conveyed by the author's personal touch which adds human drama to the description of events.

The Month In Review

INTERNATIONAL

Arab League

Sept. 7—Meeting at Casablanca, the Arab League council takes action against Israel and Zionism.

Sept. 8—The Arab League foreign ministers decide to modernize the Charter of the League.

Berlin Crisis

Sept. 28—U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower states that Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev has broken the Berlin deadlock. The President states that Khrushchev has assured him that Soviet proposals for Berlin were not designed as a "kind of threat." The President also reports that Khrushchev has not set a "fixed time" for talks on Berlin.

Disarmament

Sept. 16—In Washington, Soviet Premier Khrushchev says the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. must insure world peace or the earth will "be covered with ashes and graves."

Sept. 17—U.S. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter tells the U.N. General Assembly that the U.S. hopes the U.S.S.R. will regard the resumption of disarmament negotiations in Geneva as seriously as does the U.S.

U.S. President Eisenhower says two tests must be applied to Russian disarmament suggestions: (1) Are they fair to both sides? and (2) Can they be adequately policed?

Sept. 18—Khrushchev, in a speech to the General Assembly, suggests that all nations disarm within 4 years; he calls for withdrawal of Western forces from Europe; controls would be deferred until a late stage of disarmament.

Sept. 22—The General Assembly agrees to discuss Khrushchev's arms plan.

Christian Herter says the Soviet arms plan does not provide for an international

police force and asks who will maintain the peace.

Sept. 23—Ireland suggests the establishment of a nuclear-free Central European zone policed by U.N. forces.

Sept. 25—Pakistan proposes that within 2 years a special session of the General Assembly should consider arms reduction.

Sept. 30—French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville tells the U.N. General Assembly that the cold war must be eased before disarmament can be effected. He criticizes Khrushchev's proposals for putting disarmament before control measures.

International Atomic Energy Agency

Sept. 22—As the general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency opens in Vienna, the Soviet delegation attacks American foreign policies; a Japanese delegate, Hiroo Furuuchi, is elected president.

Latin America

Sept. 26—It is reported that a 6-month delay has been requested for signing the 7-nation free trade zone agreement for South America. The 7 nations—Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay—are working out a free trade zone to take effect over a 12-year period.

Sept. 30—The 7 nations agree on the draft for a South American free trade zone agreement.

Nato

Sept. 3—President Eisenhower visits Nato headquarters in Paris and underlines Nato's importance to the United States.

Seato

Sept. 28—After a 3-hour meeting in Washington, Seato officials agree to support Laos if necessary.

United Nations

Sept. 7—President of the Security Council Egidio Ortona rules that the Western pro-

posals to investigate the Laotian complaint is procedural and not subject to Russian veto.

The U.N. Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea reports no progress in the past year.

Sept. 14—The fourteenth annual session of the 82-nation General Assembly opens; there are 69 items on the agenda. Victor A. Belaunde of Peru is elected president.

Sept. 16—The Steering Committee of the General Assembly approves a U.S. draft resolution that the Assembly decline to debate an Indian suggestion to seat representatives of the People's Republic of China.

The U.N. subcommittee on Laos begins its investigation in Vientiane, Laos.

Sept. 21—The U.S. charges the Communist Chinese with the murder of thousands of Tibetans, in a debate on the admission of the People's Republic of China.

Sept. 22—The General Assembly bars Communist China's membership for at least a year, adopting a U.S.-sponsored resolution.

Sept. 25—The French delegation leaves the General Assembly in protest against an Arab statement on the Algerian war.

West Europe

Sept. 11—The European Economic Community agrees unanimously to allow Turkey to become associated with it; the type of association will be discussed by Turkey and the E.E.C.'s administrative commission.

AFGHANISTAN

Sept. 5—Foreign Minister and Deputy Premier Prince Sardar Mohammed Naim is welcomed by Red Chinese Premier Chou En-lai upon arriving in Peking on a week-long visit.

Sept. 19—It is reported that for the first time Afghan women have appeared in public without their veils: at a dinner for India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru the wives of prominent Afghan men appeared bare-headed.

ARGENTINA

Sept. 1—President Arturo Frondizi's economic austerity program is debated by the Chamber of Deputies for 58 hours. The Chamber does not approve the program.

Sept. 2—General Carlos Severo Toranzo Montero is ousted from his post as Commander in Chief of the Army. Secretary of War Elbio C. Anaya takes over as Commander in Chief.

Sept. 4—Army pressure causes President Frondizi to remove Secretary of War Anaya and to restore General Toranzo Montero to his post; army officers had offered to support General Toranzo Montero, who had set up his own garrison and command post following his removal.

Sept. 15—Minister of Economy Alvaro Alsogaray rejects union demands.

Sept. 16—A general strike is called by the Peronist Communist United Labor Front to protest the economic austerity program.

Sept. 23—Some two million workers go on strike.

Sept. 24—The 48-hour Peronist-Communist labor front's general strike ends.

Sept. 29—It is announced that the Argentine-Chilean border dispute has broken out again; 21 Chilean soldiers are reported to have crossed 60 miles into Argentina.

AUSTRIA

Sept. 13—A march is staged in the Austrian Tyrol to protest Italian violation of the rights of Austrian Tyrolese, as guaranteed in the Italian-Austrian Tyrol agreement of 1946.

Sept. 21—Dr. Bruno Kreisky, Austrian Foreign Minister, in an address before the U.N. General Assembly, tells Italy that unless German-speaking Tyrolese in South Tyrol (belonging to Italy) are given some measure of self-government, Austria will raise the Tyrol question in the U.N.

BELGIUM

Belgian Congo

Sept. 3—The resignation of Minister for the Belgian Congo Maurice Van Hemelrijck is accepted. Hemelrijck stood opposed to the Cabinet, which wants to delay local powers for the Congolese.

Auguste de Schryver is named Hemelrijck's successor.

Sept. 4—Premier Gaston Eyskens declares that the government stands by its pledge to give the Belgian Congo its own democratic government.

BRAZIL

- Sept. 3—President Juscelino Kubitschek's Cabinet issues a communiqué stating that the government will take steps to curb "subversive" labor riots; food shortages have created labor unrest and strikes.
- Sept. 25—It is announced that meat rationing will begin shortly because of failure to force packers' acceptance of price controls; the government will sell its meat to city butchers.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH**Canada**

- Sept. 2—The Progressive Conservatives win Prince Edward Island's provincial election, after 24 years of Liberal party control; they take 22 of the 30 seats in the provincial legislature (with one doubtful).
- Sept. 7—Quebec's Premier Maurice Duplessis dies after a series of cerebral hemorrhages.
- Sept. 11—Paul Sauve becomes Premier of Quebec.
- Sept. 24—Secretary of State for External Affairs Howard C. Green, at the U.N., asks for details of Khrushchev's disarmament plan. (For further details see *International, U.N.*)

Ceylon

- Sept. 9—The Foreign Ministry announces a government decision to establish relations with Cuba at the ambassadorial level.
- Sept. 18—Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike promises a delay of at least 10 years in nationalizing Ceylon's plantation (tea and rubber) industries.
- Sept. 25—Prime Minister Bandaranaike is shot and badly hurt by a Ceylonese monk; Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, Governor General, proclaims a state of emergency and calls for "absolute peace and calm."
- Sept. 26—Prime Minister Bandaranaike dies of his wounds, Wijayananda Dahanayake is named to replace him. The new prime minister, an anti-Communist, was formerly Education Minister in the Bandaranaike Cabinet.

Ghana

- Sept. 1—Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah tells the nation that the government will start studying plans for giving Ghana a republican form of government.

Great Britain

- Sept. 6—A 26-member advisory committee headed by Sir Walter Monckton is to study the difficulties in the Central African Federation, it is announced in London.
- Sept. 8—Prime Minister Harold Macmillan announces that general elections will be held October 8.
- Sept. 18—Conservative party leader (Prime Minister) Macmillan asks for electoral support so that his authority at a summit conference will be unchallenged.
- Queen Elizabeth II dissolves Parliament.

A Labor party manifesto pledges social reforms and contests the Conservative claim to responsibility for prosperity.

- Sept. 19—Herbert Morrison, a leading elder in the Labor party, is made a baron, as he leaves Commons for the last time.

India

- Sept. 1—The Press Trust reports that Defense Minister V. K. Krishna Menon has submitted his resignation; the report is officially denied.
- Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistani President Ayub Khan discuss Indian-Pakistani relations.
- Sept. 2—Nehru again avers his support for Krishna Menon and says that Chief of Staff General K. S. Thimayya has withdrawn his resignation.
- Sept. 4—Nehru reveals that Communist China claims that India is guilty of aggression; China asks for withdrawal of Indian troops.
- Sept. 7—Nehru submits a White Paper revealing a 5-year argument with Communist China.

The Dalai Lama disagrees with Nehru, who opposes raising the Tibetan issue in the U.N.

- Sept. 9—Pakistan protests to the U.N. Security Council against moves to take parts of Kashmir into India.

A note from Communist China made public today accuses India of trespassing in the disputed border region but offers to settle through "friendly negotiation."

- Sept. 10—Nehru appeals to China's Premier Chou En-lai for amicable solution of the border dispute.
- Sept. 12—Nehru says differences with China go beyond the border dispute.

Sept. 14—Nehru arrives in Afghanistan for a 4-day visit.

Sept. 15—Premier Sardar Mohammad Daoud of Afghanistan and Prime Minister Nehru reaffirm their belief in neutralism.

Sept. 18—India agrees to Bhutan's request for a series of roads from Bengal and Assam into the isolated Kingdom of Bhutan.

Sept. 19—It is revealed in New Delhi that India will be able to repay Soviet credits in goods rather than in money, according to an agreement signed in Moscow last week.

Malaya

Sept. 20—H. M. Tuanku Abdul Rahman, King and Paramount Ruler, has a heart attack.

Sept. 26—The Sultan of Selango, Deputy Paramount Ruler, is installed as ceremonial Chief of State because Tuanku Abdul Rahman must rest for two months.

Pakistan

Sept. 2—A conference of Cabinet members and Governors in Karachi agrees on a plan to set up "basic democracies" on a local level before the year's end.

Sept. 27—The first 128 peasant families receive certificates of land ownership under the new land reform program.

South Africa

Sept. 2—Industrialist Harry F. Oppenheimer leaves the Opposition United party. Eleven United party parliamentary members have resigned in the past two weeks.

Sept. 27—In London, the British Labor party reveals that its Commonwealth affairs specialist is not allowed into South Africa.

BRITISH EMPIRE

Basutoland

Sept. 21—It is revealed in London that Basutoland has been granted a Constitution providing for a universally-elected Legislative Council. With a single electoral roll, Basutoland will have an 80-member legislature, 76 of whom will be Africans.

Cyprus

Sept. 11—Greek sources in Nicosia reveal that Archbishop Makarios knows of an underground Greek Cypriote conspiracy against his regime.

Sept. 15—Makarios criticizes General George Grivas, former leader of the Greek Cypriote underground, and says he will not consent to let Grivas negotiate in the Cyprus situation.

Sept. 16—For the second time, Grivas offers to meet Makarios to discuss the Cyprus situation.

Sept. 20—Turkish Cypriote leader Fazil Kutchuk says the Turkish Cypriotes will not consent to Grivas' return to Cyprus.

Sept. 30—It is reported that Makarios has agreed to meet with Grivas next week.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Sept. 23—Governor Sir Robert P. Armitage appoints 4 additional Africans to the Nyasaland Legislative Council, increasing African membership by two seats. Two Africans also receive representation for the first time on the Executive Council of Nyasaland.

Kenya

Sept. 1—In notes to Egypt, the Sudan, Ethiopia and the Belgian Congo, the government declares that it needs a larger share of the Nile waters for agricultural development during the next 25 years.

Sept. 8—Sir Patrick Muir Renison is appointed new Commander in Chief and Governor of Kenya, succeeding the retiring Sir Evelyn Baring. Sir Patrick has been Commander-in-Chief and Governor of British Guiana.

BURMA

Sept. 26—The Burmese Premier, General Ne Win, arrives in Cairo for a state visit.

CAMBODIA

Sept. 1—King Norodom Surararit and his queen narrowly miss assassination when a bomb disguised as a gift explodes.

CHINA (The People's Republic)

Sept. 9—*Tass*, official Soviet press agency, issues a statement urging an end to the Indian-Chinese "frontier incident."

Sept. 11—Premier Chou En-lai's report to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (parliament) is reported by the Peking radio: Chou urges a peaceful solution to the border dispute with India and lays claim to frontier territory on the Indian side of the border. The

Premier rejects the McMahon line as determining the Chinese-Indian border.

Sept. 13—Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi charges that India has overstepped the McMahon line and has violated the “customary” Indian-Chinese border. Marshal Chen also protests that the Dalai Lama of Tibet, who was granted political asylum by India, has carried on political activities from his refuge.

The Chinese Communists briefly shell the Nationalist offshore islands.

Sept. 17—A Peking radio broadcast announces changes in Red Chinese top-ranking military personnel: Defense Minister Peng Teh-huai is replaced by Marshal Lin Piao; Minister of Public Security Marshal Lo Jui-ching is named to succeed Huang Ko-cheng as army chief of staff; General Hsieh Fu-chih becomes the new Minister of Public Security. It also is broadcast that these changes have been approved by the Red Chinese Cabinet and parliament.

Sept. 22—According to the Peking radio, Premier Chou tells former Japanese Premier Tanzan Ishibashi that good relations between China and Japan are possible. Ishibashi ends a 12-day trip to Red China.

Sept. 26—Premier Chou tells technical experts from Communist countries, in Peking for the tenth anniversary of the Chinese Communist regime on October 1, that present world conditions are more favorable towards socialism.

Sept. 28—Chief of State Liu Shao-chi reasserts Peking’s claim to the offshore Nationalist Chinese islands, which, he charges, the “U.S. still occupies.”

Sept. 30—Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev arrives in Peking for Red China’s celebration of the tenth anniversary of its Communist regime.

Premier Chou En-lai, at a banquet given by the Chinese Communists, hails Khrushchev’s trip to the U.S. Khrushchev toasts the Chinese-Soviet alliance.

CUBA

Sept. 25—Premier Fidel Castro announces an austerity program taxing imports and building up dollar reserves.

FRANCE

Sept. 3—U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower issues a joint communiqué with President Charles de Gaulle after a 2-day talk in Paris. The two leaders state that they have reached agreement on East-West problems and a better understanding of one another’s problems.

Sept. 10—The French Community’s Executive Council convenes to hear de Gaulle’s plan for an Algerian settlement.

Sept. 11—The premiers of the 12 independent African republics of the French Overseas Community close their Executive Council meeting. Ivory Coast Premier Félix Houphouët-Boigny states that the premiers have approved de Gaulle’s policy for Algeria.

Sept. 16—President Charles de Gaulle, in a nationwide television and radio broadcast, outlines his proposals for an Algerian settlement. A threefold choice is offered to Algerians: complete independence, integration with France, or a federal form of government with ties to France. De Gaulle states that the referendum in which Algerians decide their own fate will take place no more than 4 years after peaceful conditions are restored to Algeria. (For the text of these proposals see pages 303–306 of this issue.)

Sept. 17—U.S. President Eisenhower expresses his approval of de Gaulle’s Algerian plan.

Sept. 24—President Charles de Gaulle embarks on a trip through northern France defending his program of “self-determination” for Algeria.

FRENCH OVERSEAS COMMUNITY, THE Algeria

Sept. 17—In Paris, an attempt is made on the life of Hadj Messali, leader of the Algerian National Movement, rival of the Algerian National Liberation Front.

Sept. 18—Algerian National Liberation Front ministers discuss de Gaulle’s three-way proposal—full independence, integration, or federal ties—for an Algerian settlement with the provisional government’s President Ferhat Abbas. (See *France*.)

Sept. 22—U.S. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, addressing a luncheon of U.N. correspondents, expresses the hope that the

U.N. will not take any action to imperil the Algerian settlement set forth by de Gaulle. France has feared a U.N. resolution calling for Algerian independence.

Sept. 25—Terrorist bombings flare in Algiers.

Sept. 28—The Algerian Provisional Government, in a communiqué, declares that it is willing to discuss a cease-fire and de Gaulle's promise for self-determination for Algeria. The Algerian Provisional Government states that until the Algerians can choose their own government, it should be recognized as representing Algerian interests.

A French government spokesman declares that it will not answer the Algerian Provisional government's communiqué, considered a negative statement.

Cameroon

Sept. 16—It is reported that the police are holding 400 persons following clashes two days' ago in which nine persons were killed.

Mali, Federation of

Sept. 28—Senegal and Sudan, two autonomous states within the French Community which have formed the Federation of Mali, tell President de Gaulle they want even greater independence from France; they advocate commonwealth-type ties.

GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC (West)

Sept. 15—Heinrich Lübke is sworn in as the new West German president, succeeding Theodor Heuss.

Sept. 16—The Cabinet approves a tax on oil to help the coal industry, which has large surpluses.

Sept. 18—It is announced that the *Brussard*, a West German freighter carrying a cargo to North Africa, was blown up 5 days ago.

Sept. 25—The West German government is reassured by the U.S. that its stand on Berlin and the German situation has not changed.

GREECE

Sept. 18—It is announced that West Germany will lend Greece 200 million marks, or \$47.5 million.

ICELAND

Sept. 10—Foreign Minister Gudmundur I. Gudmundsson confers with his advisers

concerning an incident at the Keflavik airport September 5 when a U.S. guard ordered at gunpoint two Icelandic officials to lie in water puddles. Keflavik is in part a Nato base staffed by American troops.

Sept. 11—Iceland complains to the U.S. concerning the behavior of American forces at Keflavik.

Sept. 18—The U.S. removes Brigadier General Gilbert L. Pritchard, head of U.S. troops in Iceland, at the request of the Icelandic government.

INDONESIA

Sept. 7—The Sixth National Congress of the Indonesian Communist party meets. Stringent security regulations keep the meeting closed to reporters and the public.

Sept. 13—A statement from the army last night, confirming the detention of Attorney General Gatot Tarumamihardja by order of Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Abdul Haris Nasution, is reported.

Sept. 14—President Sukarno, on a trip through the outlying islands, cuts short his trip and returns to Jakarta following the arrest of the attorney general.

The Army states that 1100 Darul Islam rebel forces have surrendered in South Celebes.

IRAN

Sept. 26—Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi declares that he would welcome Soviet offers of aid.

IRAQ

Sept. 20—The Baghdad radio announces that 13 army officers and 4 civilians have been executed for their participation in the Mosul revolt last March against Premier Abdul Karim Kassim.

ITALY

Sept. 2—Premier Antonio Segni leaves for Paris to meet with French President de Gaulle and U.S. President Eisenhower.

Sept. 29—Segni and Foreign Minister Giuseppe Pella leave for Washington for a 3-day visit as guests of Eisenhower.

JAPAN

Sept. 7—Hearings open before the Japanese Supreme Court on whether U.S. forces may continue to be stationed there. The

Court is reviewing a district court decision last March that U.S. forces violate the anti-war provision of the Constitution.

Sept. 27—It is revealed that more than 2000 persons died from Typhoon Vera, which struck Japan this weekend; it is the worst typhoon in a quarter century.

JORDAN

Sept. 20—Premier Hazza Majali announces a Cabinet reorganization.

LAOS (See also *International, Seato and U.N.*)

Sept. 1—Foreign Minister Khamphan Panya declares that Samneua and Phongsaly provinces are now in the hands of the Laotian army.

Sept. 2—The Communist Vietnam thrust into Laos is stepped up. The first positive identification of North Vietnamese troops participating in the offensive is made.

Communist China's Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi states that his country has never "encroached upon other countries."

Sept. 4—Laos asks the U.N. to send an emergency force to help Laos repel the North Vietnamese invasion. U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold asks Security Council President Egidio Ortona to consider whether the Security Council should meet on this problem.

Sept. 5—A state of emergency is declared; rebel Pathet Lao forces have cut off Samneua, a northeast town.

Sept. 7—U.S. military arms arrive in Laos as the first shipment of an increased aid program.

Sept. 8—The Hanoi radio discloses that North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong has sent a message to Indian Prime Minister Nehru asking him to try to bring about a settlement in Laos.

It is disclosed that Laos has informed Seato it will ask that organization for aid if the U.N. does not come to Laos' assistance.

Sept. 9—A communiqué reports that Royal Lao troops have clashed with rebels in the Ma River valley.

Sept. 14—A Soviet statement calls for an international conference of the 8 nations present at the 1954 Geneva Conference to work out a Laotian settlement. The Soviet release expresses disapproval of the fact-

finding board set up by the U.N. last week to inquire into Laos' troubles.

Sept. 15—The U.S. opposes the Soviet proposal for an international conference.

The U.N. fact-finding subcommittee arrives in Laos.

Sept. 27—It is reported that government troops have retaken Muong Het, a rebel stronghold about 8 miles from the North Vietnamese border.

LEBANON

Sept. 25—Rioting against the Kassim regime in Iraq, demonstrators in Beirut clash with police.

LIBERIA

Sept. 10—The U.S. State Department reveals a defense agreement with Liberia, secretly signed last July 8.

MOROCCO

Sept. 6—Left-winger Mehdi Ben Barka, who split with the Istiqlal party in January, 1959, establishes the National Union of Popular Forces, a coalition group claiming a following of 600,000 trade union members.

Sept. 14—It is revealed that the Moroccan Communist party has been suspended by government decree.

MEXICO

Sept. 7—Mexican Communist party Secretary General Dionisio Encina Rodriguez is sent to prison to await trial. He is charged with subversive activity.

NETHERLANDS

Sept. 15—Queen Juliana opens parliament.

Sept. 21—Princess Beatrix of the Netherlands returns home after an 11-day trip through the U.S.

SAN MARINO

Sept. 14—The results of yesterday's elections to the Grand and General Council (parliament) are announced: the incumbent Christian Democratic and Social Democratic coalition wins 36 of the 60 seats; the Communist and Leftist Socialist coalition wins 24 seats.

SPAIN

Sept. 5—Spanish Foreign Minister Fernando Maria Castiella y Maiz meets for talks with French President de Gaulle in Paris.

THAILAND

Sept. 15—Thai Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chullasapya declares that the Communists have infiltrated into Thailand as well as into Laos.

TIBET (See also *International, U.N.* and *British Commonwealth, India.*)

Sept. 9—The Tibetan Dalai Lama, in exile in India, asks the U.N. to come to the assistance of his country controlled by the Chinese Communists, in a message to U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld.

Sept. 10—The U.S. expresses its approval of the Dalai Lama's action in calling U.N. attention to Tibet's plight.

Sept. 21—The Panchen Lama, whom the Chinese Communists chose to replace the Dalai Lama, leaves for Peking.

Sept. 23—Reports from Tibetans disclose that 50,000 guerillas are fighting the Communist Chinese in Tibet.

TUNISIA

Sept. 5—France and Tunisia sign a new agreement re-establishing close economic ties disrupted when Tunisia left the French customs union last month. The new agreement keeps trade between the two countries at its current figure, \$90 million annually.

U.S.S.R., THE (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy* and *International, Berlin Crisis* and *Disarmament.*)

Sept. 3—An article by Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, appearing in the U.S. periodical *Foreign Affairs*, is published. The Premier criticizes the U.S. for Captive Nations Week and says there will be no "liberating" of East Europe; calls Germany the key issue; and hopes for increased Soviet-U.S. trade.

The Moscow radio declares that there are no purges against Jews in the U.S.S.R.

Sept. 4—The American National Exhibition in Moscow closes its 6-week show.

Sept. 9—A *Tass* (Soviet official press agency) statement urges India and China to settle their frontier dispute.

Sept. 11—Boris Pasternak (author of *Dr. Zhivago*) appears in public, for the final Moscow performance by the New York Philharmonic Orchestra, for the first time since the controversy arose over his book.

Sept. 12—The Soviet Union announces that it has launched a "guided rocket" headed toward the moon.

Sept. 14—Shortly after midnight, Moscow time, the Soviet rocket hits the moon. The moon shot is an 858 pound sphere traveling 7500 miles an hour when it hits; it is an "hermetically sealed instrument container . . . the last stage of a multi-stage rocket." Although the collision is not visible from earth, radio signals from the rocket cease at the time of impact.

Sept. 15—Premier Khrushchev arrives in the U.S. and is greeted by U.S. President Eisenhower. The two leaders converse for an hour and fifteen minutes before Khrushchev begins his U.S. tour.

The *Lenin*, Soviet atomic ice-breaker, begins its first voyage. The ship carries enough fuel to stay at sea several years. The ship will keep the 11,000 mile Arctic Sea route open between Murmansk and Vladivostok.

Sept. 21—Soviet scientists announce that the last stage of the moon rocket also landed on the moon just after the instrument container struck. They report that there is no evidence of any radiation belt or magnetic field surrounding the moon.

Sept. 28—Premier Khrushchev arrives in Moscow after a 13-day trip to the U.S. He tells welcoming crowds that U.S. President Eisenhower is anxious to improve the international situation, but that there are "forces" in the U.S. that want to continue the cold war.

Sept. 29—Soviet Premier Khrushchev leaves for Peking 31 hours after his return to the Soviet Union from the U.S. (See also *China, The People's Republic.*)

UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Sept. 4—A 4-day visit between Saudi Arabia's King Saud and U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser in Cairo ends. It is reported that the two leaders have agreed to reopen diplomatic ties with Great Britain and to try to halt Communist penetration in Iraq.

Sept. 6—A new law to end foreign control of banks in the Syrian region is announced. Arabs must hold 70 per cent of a bank's stocks and must sit on a bank's board of directors in like ratio.

Sept. 10—U.A.R. Minister of Economy Ab-

del Moneim el-Kaissouni arrives in Britain on an unofficial visit, reportedly to urge increased trade.

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights

(See also *Government*, Sept. 28.)

Sept. 7—The Federal Civil Rights Commission asks President Eisenhower to appoint federal registrars to supervise voting in Southern states when officials prevent Negroes from voting.

Sept. 14—The Senate votes to extend the life of the federal Civil Rights Commission to November, 1961.

The Economy

Sept. 6—The Committee on Price Stability asks for more vigorous public measures to combat inflation in the future.

Sept. 10—Eight Federal Reserve District Banks increase the discount rate on commercial bank loans from 3½ to 4 per cent; the highest rate since 1932.

Foreign Policy

Sept. 1—Diplomatic sources in London reveal that President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State Christian Herter have rejected British proposals for an early summit meeting.

Sept. 2—At a meeting of the Central Treaty Economic Committee in Ankara, U.S. representative Donald D. Kennedy says the U.S. has given economic aid to Iran, Pakistan and Turkey this year in the amount of some \$470 million; this is a 50 per cent increase over last year.

The White House publishes a friendly exchange of letters between the President and Spanish Generalissimo Francisco Franco.

French President Charles de Gaulle welcomes President Eisenhower to Paris for diplomatic talks.

Sept. 4—President Eisenhower flies to a Scotch vacation after a 10-day European tour.

Sept. 7—President Eisenhower returns to Washington.

Sept. 11—Princess Beatrix of the Netherlands arrives in New York Harbor for an 11-day visit.

Sept. 15—Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev arrives in Washington.

Russian jamming transmitters stop in-

terfering with Voice of America broadcasts to Russia for the first time in 10 years.

Sept. 16—Khrushchev tells a group of Senators that he and President Eisenhower have agreed not to discuss third countries.

Sept. 19—In Los Angeles, Khrushchev is angered because security regulations preclude his visit to Disneyland. His welcome by the mayor is cool.

Sept. 20—Khrushchev is welcomed warmly in San Francisco.

Khrushchev dines with 7 top A.F.L.-C.I.O. officials who argue with him, revealing what he later terms "irreconcilable" differences.

Sept. 21—Philippine Ambassador Charles E. Bohlen is recalled to become adviser to Secretary of State Christian Herter.

Khrushchev greets American businessmen in a visit to a San Francisco factory and notes that Russia hopes for friendship with the American people and their government.

In an evening address, Khrushchev suggests a treaty of "friendship, nonaggression and eternal love."

Sept. 22—Khrushchev suggests that world leaders should meet once or twice yearly, in a speech in Des Moines, Iowa. He asks for a world with more meat and no H-bombs and suggests a corn-raising competition with his native region in Russia.

Sept. 23—Khrushchev confers with Adlai Stevenson, Democratic candidate for the presidency in 1952 and 1956.

Sept. 24—Khrushchev and President Eisenhower begin discussions in Washington, after Khrushchev arrives from a friendly Pittsburgh visit.

Sept. 25—President Eisenhower and Russian Premier Khrushchev fly to Camp David in Maryland to discuss world affairs.

Sept. 26—It is reported in Washington that Russia and the U.S. will engage in joint health projects, according to an agreement reached in Washington by Soviet and American medical specialists.

Sept. 27—Khrushchev's 13-day visit to the U.S. concludes with a series of understandings not yet made public. A communiqué is published revealing agreement on new Berlin talks, and on postponement of Eisenhower's Russian trip. (For the text of this communicate, see page 299 of this issue.)

Sept. 28—Khrushchev leaves for the Soviet Union.

President Eisenhower tells his news conference that personal assurance from Nikita Khrushchev has removed the "impasse" on Berlin; Khrushchev has promised that no deadline for solution of the Berlin problem will be set.

Sept. 30—Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon declares that if the Soviet Union were to make a "substantial" payment towards its World War II lend-lease debt, Soviet-U.S. trade could be increased.

Italian Premier Antonio Segni, who arrives in Washington for a 3-day visit, meets with President Eisenhower. The two leaders issue a communiqué, pointing out that the West must maintain its "defense efforts."

Government

Sept. 2—The House fails by one vote to override the President's veto of a \$1.2 billion civil works appropriation bill.

Sept. 4—The Senate upholds the President's veto of a second congressional attempt to pass housing legislation. The vote is 58 to 36.

Sept. 5—The first official U.S. educational mission to Russia reports on the "Soviet Commitment to Education"; the Russians are reported to have a "grand passion" for education, with ambition to "reach and over-reach America."

Sept. 8—The President signs a bill forbidding hunting wild horses on public lands from an airplane or motor vehicle, and barring the deliberate pollution of water holes on public lands to trap or kill wild horses.

Both houses of Congress vote a \$1.185 billion public works bill. Sixty-seven new civil construction projects provided for by the bill are opposed by the President.

Sept. 9—President Eisenhower vetoes the public works bill.

Sept. 10—Both houses of Congress override the President's veto of the public works bill. The House vote overriding the veto is 280 to 121; the Senate vote is 72 to 23. A two-thirds vote in both Houses is required for overriding the President's veto.

The President signs legislation extending for one year the Immigration Service Authority's right to issue special visas for alien orphans adopted by Americans.

Congress sends the President a bill providing salary rises for some top government officials and creating 129 new jobs.

Sept. 15—The Eighty-sixth congress ends its lengthy first session.

Sept. 19—The President says that the Eighty-sixth Congress recorded "many disappointing failures."

Sept. 21—The President signs legislation providing a one cent a gallon increase in the federal tax on gasoline, effective October 1.

The Export-Import Bank liberalizes its credit program to increase American exports.

Sept. 22—The President signs a law allowing some 57,000 aliens to enter the U.S. to join their families without being charged against quotas. Within immigration quotas, preferences are changed to give priority to relatives of U.S. citizens and resident aliens.

The President signs a bill allowing interest rates on U.S. savings bonds to be raised to 3¾ per cent; he finds that such an increase is in the national interest.

The Treasury increases interest rates on Series E and H bonds to 3¾ per cent if the investor holds the bond until it matures.

Sept. 23—The President signs a new housing bill, the third one submitted by Congress in this session. He vetoed the first two housing bills.

Sept. 24—The U.S. Bureau of the Budget estimates that the 1960 fiscal budget is still in balance, with both spending and revenue \$1.9 billion above the President's January estimate.

Sept. 26—It is revealed in Washington that Defense Secretary Neil H. McElroy's resignation is expected to be effective before Christmas; Thomas S. Gates, now Deputy Secretary of Defense, is to succeed McElroy.

Sept. 28—The President signs a foreign aid appropriations bill for \$3,225,813,000, reducing the President's request by \$704,182,000. A rider attached to the bill extends the Civil Rights Commission's life for 2 years.

The White House announces the resignation of W. Wilson White, first head of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice. A report earlier in Sep-

tember revealed that the division has not been successful in enabling any Negro to register or vote.

Sept. 29—The U.S. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Dana Latham, reports that Internal Revenue collections for fiscal 1959 totaled \$79,798,000,000, a drop of \$200 million from the 1958 total. In major categories, gross receipts are as follows (in millions of dollars): corporation income taxes, \$18,092 (1958 figure, \$20,533); individual income taxes, \$40,735 (1958 figure, \$38,569); employment taxes, \$8,854 (1958 figure, \$8,644); estate and gift taxes, \$1,335 (1958 figure, \$1,411); excise taxes, \$10,760 (1958 figure, \$10,814).

Labor

Sept. 2—A 14-member Senate-House conference committee agrees on a compromise labor reform bill.

Court-appointed monitors ask Teamsters President James R. Hoffa to remove 3 local presidents because of corruption.

Sept. 3—The Senate votes 95 to 2 to approve the labor reform bill.

Sept. 4—The House votes 352 to 52 to approve the compromise labor reform bill.

Sept. 14—The President signs the labor reform bill into law; the Department of Labor sets up a new agency to administer it. Rights of union members are safeguarded; Communists are excluded from office; former Communists and persons convicted of certain crimes are excluded from office for stated periods; secondary boycotts and recognition picketing are restricted; the so-called jurisdictional no-man's land is made an area for state jurisdiction; restrictions are placed on union funds' use; financial reports from unions are mandatory.

Court monitors charge James Hoffa with violating a federal court consent decree; they ask court hearings and removal of Hoffa if their charges are substantiated.

Sept. 16—The striking United Steelworkers make public a note from President Eisenhower offering to appoint a non-governmental board to recommend a steel settlement; the President wrote in response to a note from A.F.L.-C.I.O. President George Meany. Steelworkers' President David J. McDonald urges Eisenhower to

appoint such a nongovernmental board.

Sept. 18—Secretary of Labor James Mitchell invokes the new labor reform law to give Hoffa 10 days to report on steps he is taking to get rid of convicted criminals as union officials.

Sept. 23—The third biennial convention of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. closes with an angry argument over Jim Crow union practices.

Sept. 25—The United Steelworkers Union ends negotiations with the steel industry.

Sept. 28—Teamsters Union chief James R. Hoffa announces that only five officers or employees of his union are subject to removal under the terms of the new labor reform law.

The President asks representatives of the Steelworkers and the steel industry to separate meetings at the White House September 30.

Sept. 29—Governors of 10 states ask the President to name a personal representative as impartial steel strike mediator.

Sept. 30—At separate meetings (of almost 30 minutes apiece) with management and labor leaders in the steel industry, President Eisenhower strongly urges both groups to negotiate a steel strike settlement before he returns to Washington on October 8. The 5 major steel companies' leaders meet for two hours with steel union President David J. McDonald; it is decided to renew negotiations for a settlement, beginning October 1 in Pittsburgh (heretofore company executives had forsworn direct talks with McDonald.)

Military Policy

Sept. 9—A Navy destroyer retrieves a space capsule from the Caribbean more than 7 hours after it is fired from Cape Canaveral; the capsule, a model of the one planned for the first American astronaut, is described as being "in extremely good condition."

Sept. 23—In a reorganization of the Defense Department's space research program, the Air Force receives most of the projects handled by the Advanced Research Projects Agency.

Sept. 28—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration reports that television pictures of earth were taken by the paddle-wheel Explorer VI from space; a new and intense radiation belt around the earth is revealed.

Politics

Sept. 3—Democratic National Chairman Paul M. Butler announces formally that he plans to ask the National Committee to adopt a party loyalty rule so that Southern states with unpledged Presidential electors cannot participate in the 1960 Democratic convention. A similar rule was unanimously adopted at the 1956 convention.

Sept. 11—In New Hampshire, 40 leading Republicans ask New York's Governor Rockefeller to enter the New Hampshire Presidential preference primary next March 8, the first such primary of the 1960 campaign.

Nelson Rockefeller says he cannot say yes or no at this time to the New Hampshire request.

Sept. 12—Paul Butler introduces a new plan for voting at the 1960 Democratic Convention, to eliminate a bonus system he terms neither fair nor equitable.

Sept. 15—Louisiana's Governor Earl K. Long says he will run for Lieutenant Governor instead of Governor, with former Governor James E. Noe running for Governor.

Sept. 16—The Democratic National Committee adopts a "good faith" rule to force Southern states to support the party's 1960 presidential candidates; state representation is reapportioned and the total number of convention votes is raised from 1372 to 1511.

Sept. 18—Adlai Stevenson asks supporters in Oregon not to place his name on the primary ballot for presidential candidate.

Sept. 19—Democratic leaders of the 14-state Democratic Midwest Conference make it clear that the organization is split beyond reconciliation because of basic policy disagreements among leaders as to the purpose of the organization, traditionally designed to support agricultural legislation favorable to the Midwest.

Sept. 20—House Republican leader Charles A. Halleck of Indiana says he would serve as Republican vice presidential candidate.

Sept. 24—Democratic Senator John F. Kennedy starts a 3-day tour of Wisconsin to campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination.

Segregation

Sept. 1—Seven new Negroes are added to

four already going to Stratford Junior High School in Arlington County, Virginia: Washington-Lee High School admits its first four Negroes; a Negro student is admitted for the first time to Patrick Henry Elementary School in Arlington. No integration has begun in nearby Fairfax County, Virginia.

Sept. 2—Token integration begins quietly at Durham and Winston-Salem, North Carolina.

Sept. 7—Two buildings and a city-owned automobile are dynamited in Little Rock, Arkansas.

Sept. 8—Token integration begins quietly in Miami, Florida, eighth Southern state to begin to comply with the Supreme Court order on desegregation.

Desegregation is widened in Warren County, Virginia, as 289 whites attend classes with 21 Negroes at Warren County High School without incident.

Sept. 9—Delaware begins its plan for integration of a grade a year, beginning with the first grade, where 18 Negroes now attend formerly all-white elementary schools.

Sept. 10—Eight Negroes register at Memphis State University, formerly closed to Negroes.

Sept. 14—White parents in Queens, New York, keep children home as Negro and Puerto Rican youngsters from Brooklyn are transferred to predominantly white schools in Queens.

Sept. 15—White children return quietly to school in Queens, New York.

Sept. 21—The U.S. Court of Appeals decides that Arkansas' pupil placement laws are valid.

Sept. 30—Little Rock's all-white Raney High School is permanently shut down following a vote by the Board of Directors of the Little Rock Private School Corporation yesterday to put itself "out of existence."

VENEZUELA

Sept. 4—Constitutional guarantees, revoked after disturbances last month, are restored.

VIETNAM, NORTH

Sept. 27—North Vietnam accuses South Vietnam of increasing its air bases from 6 to 46 since the Indochina armistice, in a letter to the International Armistice Commission.

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